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
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THESIS

THE SOVIET CENTRAL ASIAN CHALLENGE:
A NEO-GRAMSCIAN ANALYSIS

by

Allen E. Dorn

September 1986

Thesis Advisor: Jan A. Dellenbrant

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19 ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) The Soviet Union faces a revolutionary challenge from its Central Asian Muslim population which is capable of undermining Soviet authority in the region. This thesis establishes a neo-Gramscian theory for analyzing the Soviet Central Asian challenge as a developing counterhegemonic movement against the Russian-dominated State. Antonio Gramsci's theory of hegemony and counterhegemony explains the mechanism of rule essential for group control of a state as well as the mechanism of revolt required to permit a subordinate group to stage a successful social revolution. For the purpose of this thesis, traditional Gramscian theory was broadened to allow its application to societies like the Soviet Union where the dominant division of civil society is not economic class but rather nationality group. From this neo-Gramscian perspective, the Soviet Union is a "State of nations" hegemonically ruled by a single nation - the Russian nation - through a national ideology - Russian communism. The Central Asian counterhegemonic challenge to Russian hegemony revolves around three key issues: the rapidly expanding Muslim population of the region,					
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the continued strength of Soviet Islam and Sufism, and Central Asia's Muslim nationalism. This thesis concludes that the Central Asian challenge appears capable of producing a successful Gramscian counter-hegemonic revolution against the Soviet State without foreign aid or support. ←

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The Soviet Central Asian Challenge:
A Neo-Gramscian Analysis

by

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DISCLAIMER

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I. INTRODUCTION

Surely it is within the Central Asian regions of Russia, and the Central Asian borders of Russia, that the real problems of the immediate future are going to develop. Chester Wilmot, 1952. [Ref. 1:p. ii]

Soviet Central Asia poses a definite challenge to the domestic stability of the Soviet Union.¹ The Soviet Union is a multi-ethnic community of over one hundred different ethnic groups and nationalities. Yet one particular transethnic group, the Soviet Muslim² population appears unwilling to turn from its national and cultural identity and assimilate within the "Soviet" culture. Thus the Soviet State of over 262 million people (according to the official Soviet census of 1979) faces an active cultural resistance among its 43 million Soviet Muslims. The vast majority (i.e., 75 percent) of the Soviet Muslims are concentrated in Soviet Central Asia or what was formerly called Tsarist Turkestan. This cultural challenge appears strongest among these Muslim peoples in part because of the geographic contiguity of the four Socialist Republics of Central Asia proper, their common historical and religious background, their common position as part of the Soviet Union's periphery, and the presence of fellow Muslim co-ethnics across the border in Afghanistan and Iran. Yet the nature of this challenge is ill-defined by Western experts who neglect to frame the challenge in

¹Soviet Central Asia is the region occupied by four Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs): Turkmen, Uzbeks, Kirghiz, and Tajiks. Kazakhstan is not normally included as part of Soviet Central Asia proper.

²According to Alexander Bennigsen and Marie Broxup, two experts on Soviet Muslims,

in the USSR, the term "Muslim" is generally used to describe a people who before the 1917 Revolution belonged to the Muslim religion and culture. It has, therefore, a national and cultural significance beyond the purely religious one. [Ref. 2:p. 1]

This author considers the term "Muslim" to be a term of national identity. In attempting to define the nationality of Central Asians, a transethnic term such as "Muslim" or even "Turkic peoples" may prove more useful and accurate than the contrived ethnic identities applied by the Russian Bolsheviks to Turkestan. In identifying the relationship between Russian ethnicity and national identity there is no such separation -- ethnicity equals nationality. The official Soviet state position is to equate these two -- ethnicity and nationality -- as well.

theoretical terms. In fact, the voluminous literature written by Central Asian experts concerning this challenge deals primarily with the particularistic problems facing the Soviets in the region (i.e., demographics, cultural assimilation, national identity, Islamic revivalism, and nationality power). The vast majority of this writing is descriptive or historical or both, emphasizing a particular problem or set of problems from a nontheoretical perspective. This extensive literature is void of any universalistic theory that can both encompass the particularistic problems that Central Asia poses to the Soviet state and provide the essential framework for their discussion and analysis. Such a framework will allow analysts to achieve not only a more accurate description and explanation of the challenge, but also a better prediction and prescription as well.

The purpose of this paper is to establish a neo-Gramscian³ theoretical perspective for discussing the particularistic problems of Central Asia. In this light, the Soviet Central Asian challenge is a counterhegemonic challenge to the hegemony of Russian nationalism and Russian communism. Antonio Gramsci's theory of hegemony and counterhegemony explains the mechanism of rule essential for group control of a state as well as the mechanism of revolt required to permit a subordinated group to stage a social revolution. Therefore, this analysis will look at the challenge from the perspective of revolutionary theory. First, this paper will establish a neo-Gramscian theoretical base from which to examine both Russian hegemony and Central Asian counterhegemony. Second, the Soviet Union will be analyzed as an hegemonically ruled state. Since any revolution is primarily a challenge directed against a state's ability to affect and maintain its rule, our understanding of Russian hegemony is key to clearly perceiving the importance of this challenge. Third, the concept of counterhegemony will be applied specifically to Soviet Central Asia where a developing Muslim counterhegemonic movement is taking form. This movement, using Gramsci's alternative revolutionary strategy, can serve as a mechanism for revolt against the Russian ruled State. Soviet Central Asian counterhegemony revolves around two vitally important themes: Muslim nationalism and the Islamic religion. By analyzing the Central Asian challenge from this perspective, we can not only place the

³This paper is classified as a "neo-Gramscian" analysis rather than a "Gramscian" analysis because the author has broadened original Gramscian theory beyond its traditional economic foundations, and has chosen to emphasize the theory's non-economic factors. As a result, a neo-Gramscian perspective permits the application of Gramsci's theory concerning the state and social revolution to societies where the dominant social division is not horizontally stratified economic classes, but rather vertically stratified nationality groups.

particularistic issues of Central Asia in a larger, more universalistic theory, we can take a different, often overlooked "analytic cut" at a problem which may ultimately undermine both the Russian's hegemonic rule and the stability of the Soviet state.

II. COUNTERHEGEMONIC IDEAS: A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

Antonio Gramsci, an Italian Marxist, politician, and journalist never composed a systematic work or left a completed theoretical thesis. Nevertheless, this former co-founder of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) articulated a "Marxist science of political action" which is still relevant today [Ref. 3:p. 65]. For Gramsci, "politics is the central human activity" by which an individual comes into contact with his world. [Ref. 4:p. 23] Gramsci, in the years following World War I, saw the failure of a workers' revolutionary movement in Italy. The traditional Marxist strategy of revolution failed to account for the stability of the bourgeois class in the Italian state. As a result, he conceptualized an alternative Marxist view of the State as the entire set of activities with which the ruling class or group "not only justifies and maintains its dominance, but [also] manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules." [Ref. 4:p. 244]. With the State defined in hegemonic terms, he was able to develop an alternative strategy for its revolutionary overthrow - subordinate class counterhegemony.

A. A NONMARXIAN APPROACH

Nonmarxists have often overlooked Gramsci's theory and revolutionary strategy due to his emphasis on achieving a successful proletarian (i.e., class based) revolution. Gramsci's works are well known and respected within Marxist circles but are undervalued in non-Marxist circles. Joseph Femia, in a review article on "Gramsci's Patrimony," asserts that "no Marxist thinker, apart from Marx himself, is so universally respected and admired as Antonio Gramsci, one of the originators of what Merleau-Ponty called 'Western Marxism.'" [Ref. 5:p. 327] Yet Gramsci's works transcend the Marxist theoretical milieu. His conceptualization of the hegemonic state and his alternative revolutionary strategy can be invaluable to non-Marxist analysis. Gramsci, despite his historical materialist⁴ perspective, does attribute importance to non-economic factors like ideology, ideas, values, beliefs, culture, and politics. By

⁴An historical materialist is one who acknowledges that beliefs arise from the economic base of society (i.e., a specific mode of production) and in some sense reflect it [Ref. 5:p. 347]. An historical materialist, like Marx or Gramsci, considers the mode of production as the dominating factor in social relationships, social organization, and social ideas.

broadening Gramscian theory beyond its original economic foundation, the author does not compromise either the strength or validity of Gramsci's concepts of hegemony or his alternative strategy of revolution.

The key to applying Gramscian or neo-Gramscian theory is to make the distinction between dominant and subordinate social divisions within a society. These social divisions can reflect a predominance of either the horizontal or vertical stratification of civil society. If these social divisions are economically determined, as they were for Gramsci, then the divisions reflect the horizontal stratification of society and are called "classes." If, however, those divisions are not economically determined or do not reflect horizontal stratification, then the term "group" is far more appropriate to describe the vertical stratification of society. In reality, within any society both vertical and horizontal divisions exist simultaneously. While in some societies the dominant division of control and intersocial cleavage is class-based (i.e., a horizontally stratified society), in other societies (i.e., a vertically stratified society), these divisions can be primordial-based (e.g., family, clan or tribe) or ethnic-based (e.g., national identity). As such, the important characteristic for applying Gramscian or neo-Gramscian theory to a particular society is to identify the dominant social division of control and intersocial cleavage.⁵ For the purposes of this chapter, the terms "class" and "group" will be used interchangeably, reflecting differences between authors, and will imply the dominant social division appropriate for a particular society.

B. HEGEMONY AND THE STATE

1. Hegemony: A Mechanism for Rule

Gramsci's theory of hegemony, set out in his unfinished work *Prison Notebooks*, "is founded on a simple premise: that modern man is not ruled by force alone, but also by ideas." [Ref. 5:p. 346] Thus, the dominant ruling group does not have to rely solely on physical domination to maintain their ruling position. It is possible to ideologically co-opt subordinate groups into maintaining the ruling status quo. The subordinate groups, or those who obey the State, do so willingly - whether

⁵Gramsci himself was openly hostile to those who approached revolutions from an "internationalist" perspective. He defended the national character of revolutions and insisted that revolutionary strategy be adapted "to real men, formed in specific historical relations, with specific feelings, outlooks." [Refs. 5,6:pp. 351,198] Nevertheless, he still considered the dominant social division to be determined by the specific economic structure of the society and the particular mode of production. As a result his writings reflect an emphasis on horizontal class analysis, not vertical group analysis.

completely or in part - because they perceive reality through the conceptual framework of the dominant class. As a result, individual who should be alienated by and contending against the State (e.g., proletarian individuals in a bourgeois-dominated State) are in fact not alienated. Gramsci considers the subordinate groups to have "bought into" the social vision of the dominant group, sharing both their values and standards in common. Subordinated groups can then be exploited by the dominant group and yet not perceive their exploitation because they accept the dominant "weltanschauung." This ideological predominance of the dominant group leaves subordinate groups passive towards revolution and willing to "wear their chains."

Hegemony is a mechanism for social rule often overlooked by the Marxists prior to Gramsci. While it is true that the Russian Social-Democrats at the turn-of-the-century frequently used the term "gegemoniya" implying the hegemony of leadership of the proletariat over other potentially revolutionary classes, pre-Gramscian concepts of hegemony lacked the idea of cultural ascendancy. Gramsci broadened the concept of hegemony from political leadership within an alliance of revolutionary groups and used it to define a "mechanism of rule applicable to any set of social relations where one group holds sway." [Ref. 5:pp. 346-347] The cultural ascendancy of the ruling group serves as the mechanism of rule for the society and allows for group dominance within the society [Ref. 7:p. 473]. While Marx and Engels in *The German Ideology* recognized that the ruling ideas of society are the ideas of the ruling class, they failed to appreciate the role of noneconomic factors in achieving social dominance. Marx recognized that in a bourgeois society, the mechanism of class exploitation was the capitalist mode of production (i.e., private property). But Marx did not see noneconomic factors like ideology and culture as essential to bourgeois rule. As a result, the class struggle was limited to the economic and political level. While Marx explained why the proletariat ought to revolt, Gramsci specified why they probably would not. Giuseppe Fiori, in his book *Antonio Gramsci, Life of a Revolutionary*, explains Gramsci's contribution to Marxism and revolutionary theory this way.

Gramsci's originality as a Marxist lay partly in his conception of the nature of bourgeois rule (and indeed of any previous established social order), in his argument that the system's real strength does not lie in the violence of the ruling class or the coercive power of its state apparatus, but in the acceptance by the ruled of a "conception of the world" which belongs to the rulers. The philosophy of the ruling class passes through a whole tissue of complex vulgarizations to emerge as "common sense": that is, the philosophy of the masses who accept the morality, the customs, the institutionalized behavior of the society they live in.

The problem for Gramsci then is to understand how the ruling class has managed to win the consent of the subordinate classes in this way; and then, to see how the latter will manage to overthrow the old order and bring about a new one of universal freedom. [Ref. 7:p. 238]

Giuseppe Fiori highlights a fundamental principle of hegemony: it permits the dominant class or group to affect their rule using consensus rather than coercion.⁶ Two questions arise from this observation. First, if hegemony permits consensual rule, what effect does this have on traditional Marxist-Leninist theories about the State? Second, what are the hegemonic apparatuses which permit the dominant group or class to effect consensual rule? After all, these apparatuses allow the dominant group "to establish its view of the world as all inclusive and universal, and to shape the interests and needs of subordinate groups [or classes]." [Ref. 3:p. 70]

2. The State: Consensus and Coercion

Gramsci's conception of the State differed from the classical Marxist and Leninist conception. For Marx and Lenin "every state is a dictatorship based upon force and coercion." [Ref. 3:p. 347] As a result, they conceptualized a conflict model of society, dominated by class struggle. The State represented only the ruling class which waged a class war based on coercion and force against all its class enemies. As a dictatorship, the State would punish those who reject its authority, violate its rules or challenge its fundamental foundations. The State, as an instrument of the ruling class, used fear to maintain social stability. Thus, the economic infrastructure of society (or base), called the mode of production, permitted a specific class to dominate its class enemies through physical despotism. As long as a capitalist economic infrastructure of society existed, a "dictatorship of the bourgeois" would affect State rule. Even after a proletarian revolution established public ownership of property as the economic structure of society, the state would remain a dictatorship. In a socialist society, it would be a "dictatorship of the proletariat" aligned with its class allies - the peasantry - using coercion and force against its class enemies - the remaining bourgeois elements. Only after the bourgeoisie elements were removed and class conflict ended would the State begin to wither away. But the nature of the State never changed; it only atrophied away due to a lack of use in a society absent of class conflict.

⁶While this consensus rule may appear similar to a "social contract", for Marxists it is a social contract in error. Historical materialists insist that even if the proletariat consent to bourgeois rule, that consent is error and only prolongs their class aberration.

Gramsci, while accepting the premise that every state ultimately functions as a "dictatorship", also recognized that different forms of rule existed beyond the classical Marxist interpretation of the State. Western societies, like Italy, were able to maintain a high degree of internal cohesion among class enemies. This cohesion produced a social stability unexplainable by the conflict model, or the use of coercive force. Gramsci postulated that the obedience of the Italian proletariat to a state operating in opposition to proletarian interests was not garnered by fear but by integration. The masses, through hegemony were morally and culturally integrated into the state as a result of the cultural despotism and hegemony of the ruling class - the bourgeoisie. In this context, the State serves as an "educator" instructing the masses in the beliefs and values of the dominant group. The real struggle within society is the struggle for consciousness between the dominant and subordinate groups in the society. And an educator state, serving to affect hegemony over the consciousness of the masses, can produce mass consensus in favor of the dominant culture. Thus, Italy and other Western societies illustrated for Gramsci a consensus model of society.

For Gramsci, both models - consensus and conflict - are required to explain the State. The vast majority of the masses consent to and are integrated into the hegemony of the dominant, ruling group. Hence, the State functions chiefly as an "educatorship." Therefore, the primary role of the State is as a hegemonic apparatus, expanding the cultural dominance of the ruling group over the masses. Yet, not all of society will consent to their integration into the ruling group's value system. This "fringe" minority of society maintains a conflictual relationship with the ruling groups, rejecting both their rule and their dominance, especially in the arena of consciousness. As a result, the State must also function as a "dictatorship" against these fringe elements and use coercion, force and fear to affect its rule. Otherwise, the coercive side of the State remains covert or in the background, acting only as a vehicle of enforcement and threat. Using this approach, the Gramscian state is primarily an "educatorship of the dominant group" effecting its rule through "hegemony" over a primarily "consensus model of society." In a secondary, more limited capacity, the Gramscian State functions as a "dictatorship of the dominant group" affecting its rule through "coercion" over a lesser "conflict model of society." The exact synthesis of these two state roles - educator and dictator - vary from national setting to national setting, and from one time period to another. But the existence of these two roles is essential to understanding the primary apparatuses of state rule.

3. The State: Hegemonic Apparatuses

Gramsci's view of the State as both educator and dictator, leads to the question: "What did Gramsci mean by the State?" In his final work, *Prison Notebooks*, we find some answers.

We are still on the terrain of the identification of State and government - an identification which is precisely a representation . . . of the confusion between civil society and political society. For it should be remarked that the general notion of State includes elements which need to be referred back to the notion of civil society (in the sense that one might say that State = political society + civil society, in other words hegemony protected by the armour of coercion). [Ref. 6:p. 263]

Political society and civil society are the two levels of societal superstructure. The victorious elements of political society make up the political regime. The political regime controls government, which stands at the apex of the State structure, and uses this institutional bridge between society and the State to effect the regime's rule.⁷ Thus, the State is the institutional reflection of three elements: a political regime, the two levels of superstructure (political society and civil society) and the infrastructure or base (an economic base called "the mode of production"). Civil society is "the ensemble of organisms commonly called 'private'." [Ref. 6:p. 12] Joseph Femia, in his review article on "Gramsci's Patrimony," lists the key aspects of civil society as political parties, schools and universities, the mass media, trade unions, churches, etc. These are the private organisms or structures of civil society which shape the social and political consciousness of the masses. The ruling group both controls these

⁷Gramsci's major work suffers from its lack of completeness. Within the *Prison Notebooks* Perry Anderson has identified three definitions of the State and its place in hegemony. In the first definition there is opposition between the State and civil society. In the second definition, the State includes or encompasses civil society. And in the third view, the State and civil society are considered identical. [Ref. 8] Additionally, Joseph Femia has identified both a narrow definition of the State as synonymous with political society and a broader definition "comprehending all institutions which, whether formally public or private, enable the dominant social group to rule." [Ref. 5:p. 348] This author, like Martin Carnoy, accepts a broader view of the State as encompassing all of the societal superstructure, i.e., both political and civil society. As such, hegemony represents a synthesis - "this hegemony is everywhere, but in different forms" - as either political hegemony or civil hegemony. [Ref. 3:p. 73] (For a contrary opinion see Femia [Ref. 9:p. 482].) While Gramsci does not expressly distinguish between the State, the government, the political regime, and the political society, this distinction is useful for analytic purposes. Since the State does encompass all institutions which enable the dominant social group to rule, the author's distinction is compatible but not identical with Gramsci's theory. For Gramsci, government was the State. For the author, government is only the apex of the State. This distinction can be quite useful when analyzing which faction of the dominant social group actually possesses the political power to make hegemonic decisions for society - i.e., which faction controls the political regime and through it government and the State.

apparatuses of transmission of ideas and values and uses them to establish its hegemony.⁸ In contrast, political society consists of all the structures commonly called public institutions. Femia lists these public institutions as the courts, the police, parliament, the army, the bureaucracy, the government, etc. These structures allow the ruling group to exercise direct dominance over the masses. Both structures are ultimately controlled by the ruling group and both affect the hegemonic control for the ruling group.⁹ The public institutions manifest the overt coercive forces of the ruling group. The public institutions serve as the armor of coercion protecting the private structures of civil society. The ruling class has less overt control over the more autonomous private structures which transmit the ruling culture throughout civil society. Yet, because they dominate the various institutions and can monopolize the ideas transmitted by the institutions, the ruling class can continue to shape the consciousness of the masses. Only in those private structures which are largely outside their control (such as the family unit), as well as those institutions (or individuals) which oppose their hegemonic values and have not been silenced via coercion (such as dissident institutions) is a constant struggle for consciousness being waged. Yet, regardless of the structure or institution - the obvious, coercive-backed public institutions in political society or the more subtle, private institutions in civil society - the struggle for ideas is weighted largely in favor of the ruling group.¹⁰ [Ref. 5:p. 348] In commenting on this weighted struggle, an obvious question arises concerning hegemony and the State.

If, as Gramsci says, the bourgeoisie [i.e., dominant class or group] can generally count on the "spontaneous consent" of the masses, it gains political legitimacy by weaving its own cultural outlook into the social fabric, then how can forms of oppositional, alternative thought (such as Marxism [or any other revolutionary or dissident thought]) ever manage to flourish? [Ref. 5:p. 348]

⁸Civil superstructures are "civil" due to their private ownership by civil society, rather than their function as "transmission belts." Civil superstructures, as opposed to political superstructures, are outside direct, overt State control. Hence function is less the determining factor than ownership.

⁹This emphasis for ruling group control applies easily to authoritarian States. However, it is less appropriate or inappropriate for pluralistic democratic States like the United States.

¹⁰The ruling group controls both the hegemonic structures and institutions which serve to promote consensus, as well as the coercive structures and institutions which prevent opposition and dissent.

The answer to that question lies in Gramsci's view of counterhegemony and social revolutions.

C. COUNTERHEGEMONY AND REVOLUTION

1. Counterhegemony: A Mechanism for Revolution.

Counterhegemony is a mechanism for revolution. Gramsci interpreted the unnaturally long life of capitalism in the West not to the technological efficiency of a mass capitalist society - the economic base of society. Rather he attributed capitalism's longevity to the normative order propagated by the ideological superstructures of the State. A inherently unstable state, for Gramsci, can only survive "because the organs of civil society hide the regime's structural inadequacies behind a thick ideological veil." [Ref. 9:p. 476] Gramsci felt the only way to defeat such a state was to counter the hegemony of the dominant ruling group. Hence, he advocated the establishment of a nucleus of counterhegemonic culture and social relations, completely contrary to the culture and social relations of the dominant group. The counterhegemony should occur prior to any attempt to overthrow the existing state. One analyst describes a "Gramscian revolution" this way,

at the heart of [Gramsci's] political thinking lies a paradox: a revolution must occur *before* the revolution; i.e., a fundamental transformation of the spirit and practice of present-day society is a precondition of proletarian revolution [or of social revolution in general]. [Ref. 9:p. 477].

Thus Gramsci, by emphasizing the role of a counterhegemonic revolution prior to an actual revolt, has fixed the "battle for the mind" as the first stage of a social revolution. The second stage of a social revolution would be the "battle for state power." One could even equate a hegemonic-counterhegemonic "battle for the mind" as a Gramscian form of a revolution-from- below.¹¹ This "battle for the mind" or counterhegemony is a required mechanism for revolt-especially in Western states.¹²

¹¹A revolution-from-below is also called a bottom-up revolution, a mass revolution and even an Asian model of revolution. In a revolution-from-below, the mobilization of the masses in civil society is required to occur either prior to or simultaneous with the paramilitary assault on the State itself. For Gramsci, the timing is far more precise - the mobilization of the consciousness of the masses must first take place (i.e., win the "battle for the mind" using counterhegemony), and then the direct attack on the State can begin. Thus a Leninist type of revolution, a largely top-down revolution, is contrary to Gramsci's strategy. After all, if a Leninist revolutionary party wins control over the State, it still must win the "battle for the mind" before its social vision can proceed by consensual means rather than coercive means.

¹²Gramsci distinguished between modern states and backward countries. In

The "battle for the mind" pits hegemonic forces against counterhegemonic forces competing for the control of man's thoughts (or consciousness). In a successful hegemony, the dominant group tries to actively attract all other groups - the whole of society - in order to expand its state power. "Successful" hegemony frees the coercive apparatuses of constraint, lessens the need for punitive violence and prevents the State from the continued need to impose its ideology [Ref. 10:p. 81]. One can even speak of "integral" hegemony where the masses are so integrated into the dominant culture that their affiliation approaches unqualified support. Integral hegemony can continue to exist, as long as the ruling group performs a progressive function causing the whole society to move forward. [Ref. 5:p. 348] These two - successful and integral - hegemonies represent hegemonic situations of strong intensity.

Gramsci recognized that hegemonic situations vary in intensity. In some cases, the hegemonic structure of society shows signs of decay. The mass consent of subordinate groups to the dominant group is only superficial. A person's conscious thoughts and the unconscious values evident by his actions are frequently incompatible and at odds. Gramsci calls this kind of contradiction between thoughts (i.e., explicit consciousness) and action (i.e., implicit consciousness) an expression of a "contradictory consciousness."

This contrast between thought and action, i.e., the co-existence of two conceptions of the world, one affirmed in words and the other displayed in effective action . . . cannot but be the expression of profounder contrasts of a social historical order. It signifies that the social group in question may indeed have its own conception of the world, even if only embryonic; a conception which manifests itself in action, but occasionally in flashes - when, that is, the group is acting as an organic totality. But this same group has, for reasons of

backward countries, like Russia in 1917,

the State was everything, civil society was primordial and gelatinous; in the West, there was a proper relation between State and civil society, and when the State trembled, a sturdy structure of civil society was at once revealed. [Ref. 6:p. 238]

Thus backward states, for Gramsci, lack developed mechanisms of cultural organization, and the social order is founded on ignorance and repression. The masses are not integrated into the political regime's value system. In a backward state, where stability is not based on voluntary consent, when the State is attacked only a weak superstructure of civil society exists to keep social order. In a backward state where no real hegemony exists, a top-down revolution can occur and no counterhegemonic struggle is needed to affect a social transformation. While Gramsci's point is largely correct, some backward third world states have an highly developed hegemony. Afghanistan is an example of such a backward country, and the Mujahideen counterrevolution is an example of how strong Afghanistan's pre-1978 hegemony was.

submission and intellectual subordination, adopted a conception which is not its own but is borrowed from another group The active man-in-the-mass has a practical activity, but has no clear theoretical consciousness of his practical activity One might almost say that he has two theoretical consciousnesses (or one contradictory consciousness): one which is implicit in his activity . . . and one, superficially explicit or verbal, which he has inherited from the past and uncritically absorbed. [Ref. 6:pp. 327, 333]

Thus, on the abstract plane the common man endorses the prevailing weltanschauung or dominant ideology. But on a practical plane, he does not reveal open dissent and opposition. Rather, his discontent erupts occasionally and takes the form of protests, demonstrations, riots, crime, strikes. At the practical level, a contradictory consciousness reflects both a reduction in individual commitment to the dominant ideology as well as the incipient existence of a "revolutionary mentality."

A contradictory consciousness arises in a "decadent" hegemony which possesses an ambivalent and inconsistent mass consciousness. A decadent hegemony is

powerful enough to ensure "passivity and submission", but none the less vulnerable, out of harmony with the true needs and inclinations of the people. Conflict lurks just beneath the calm surface of social life. [Ref. 5:p. 349]

In order for this out-of-touch hegemonic state to be revolutionarily transformed, a "crisis of hegemony" must occur.

2. Gramsci's Revolution

a. A Crisis of Hegemony

The first stage of a Gramscian revolution - winning the "battle for the mind" via counterhegemony - should provoke a crisis of hegemony. A crisis of hegemony arises when the dominant group (through the State) is placed in a position where it can no longer exert consensual rule. The dominant group's authority to rule is severely challenged and the State itself is facing a serious general crisis. The traditional means of maintaining dominant-class hegemony is no longer effective.

If the ruling class has lost its consensus, i.e., is no longer "leading" but only "dominant," exercising coercive force alone, this means precisely that the great masses have become detached from their traditional ideologies, and no longer believe what they used to believe previously, etc. The crisis consists that the old is dying and the new cannot be born. [Ref. 6:pp. 25-26]

This crisis can arise out of unpopular actions by the ruling group (through the State), domestic or economic crises handled poorly by the ruling group resulting in serious

consequences, poor handling of governmental reforms, widespread unbelief in the ideology of the State, hardships which become so intolerable that no force is capable of mitigating it and re-establishing social order legally. Ultimately a crisis of hegemony reflects both a crisis of the State and a crisis in the belief system of the ruling group. A crisis of hegemony indicates the disintegration of the apparatuses and capabilities of the State to maintain and further the dominant group's hegemony, and maintain the dominant group's capability to rule indirectly through the ideological superstructures of the State. [Ref. 3:pp. 78-79] At times of a potential crisis of hegemony, the State can attempt to resecure its position via a passive revolution or governmental reform.

b. A Passive Revolution.

The term "passive revolution" was used by Gramsci to indicate a "revolution" without a "revolution." [Ref. 6:p. 59] A passive revolution, according to Martin Carnoy, involves

the constant reorganization of State power and its relationship to the dominated classes to preserve dominant-class hegemony and to exclude the masses from exerting influence over political and economic institutions Faced by potential active masses, then, the State institutes passive revolution as a technique that the bourgeoisie [i.e., dominant class or group] attempts to adapt when its hegemony is weakened in any way. [Ref. 3:p. 76]

Hegemony can be threatened in several ways. First, it can be threatened during times of erupting discontent, as a result of a widespread contradictory consciousness on the practical plane. This is especially the case in decadent hegemonic situations where the State is trying to maintain passivity and submission of the population. Second, hegemony can be threatened by an expanding counterhegemonic movement which represents an ideological or cultural position which is alternate to and exclusive of the hegemonic ideology or culture. Third, a crisis of hegemony can result from either a poorly effected previous reform or the need for current reform. During times of a crisis of hegemony, the State may choose to have a passive revolution. Fourth, whenever the political superstructure (i.e., the State's combined coercive apparatus and hegemonic apparatus) cannot cope with the fundamental demands of subordinate groups, regardless of whether these demands are counterhegemonic or not, hegemony is threatened. The key here is whether the demand is fundamental to the group and beyond the coercive power of the State. One of the goals of a passive revolution is to

encourage subordinate groups to restrict their struggle against the State and accept the legitimacy of dominant group rule of the State in return for the acceptance of certain demands from below. Therefore, the revolution is passive because it consists in "preventing the development of a revolutionary adversary by 'decapitating' its revolutionary potential." [Ref. 11:p. 133] This allows the ruling group to survive despite challenges to its rule. In fact, one of the problems facing a revolutionary is how to challenge the State's hegemony without provoking a passive revolution. After all, a revolutionary seeks a complete social transformation, not just limited acceptance of certain demands or partial reforms. This is why a "revolution without a revolution" can be disastrous for those who seek the complete restructuring of the State's superstructure or infrastructure (base).

Each passive revolution can be evaluated from two vantage points: did it involve an acceptance of demands from below and did it undercut the revolutionary potential of subordinate groups. Just because a subordinate group gets the government to accept certain demands, does not imply a passive revolution. It just means the government, by accepting a passive revolution has starved-off an active revolution. This explains one reason why most dissident movements fail to become revolutionary. Most dissident movements are satisfied with only changing a specific policy or mode of rule. They do not seek to fundamentally displace either the hegemonic rule of the dominant group or its hegemonic apparatuses (i.e., the political and civil superstructure of the State). Thus, these movements normally have little revolutionary potential and are satisfied with relatively limited reforms. As a result, most dissident movements never provoke a real passive revolution and never threaten the hegemony of the ruling group. Additionally, not all governmental reforms undercut revolutionary potential. At times, governmental policies change, not as a result of demands from below but as a result of policy choices from on top. Sometimes these reforms in fact encourage revolutionary potential. This type of reform is not a passive revolution and can provoke a future crisis of hegemony. Lastly, at times the ruling group attempts an unsuccessful passive revolution - accepting demands from below but not undercutting the revolutionary potential. At times like this, with its hegemony already threatened, a crisis of hegemony will develop. From this discussion, one of the key threats to a developing counterhegemony can be a successful passive revolution. Thus in those States who hegemonic rule can accommodate change, the

ruling group is normally effective at passive revolution and maintaining its ruling position. But in States whose hegemonic rule is both inflexible and unchanging, most passive revolutions prove unsuccessful and do not remove revolutionary potential¹³

c. An Alternative Revolutionary Strategy

Gramsci's concepts of hegemony, counterhegemony, crisis of hegemony and passive revolution stem directly from one of his fundamental premises - the superstructure of the State plays the primary role in the ruling group's ability to dominate the consciousness of subordinate groups. From this premise, Gramsci developed an alternative revolutionary strategy called the "war of position." This strategy was an alternate to what he called the "war of maneuver" or the frontal attack on the State by paramilitary forces. Gramsci sought to explain his strategy in the military terms of the First World War:

The [Western] State was only an outer ditch, behind which there stood a powerful system of fortresses and earthen works [i.e., civil society] more or less numerous from one State to the next, it goes without saying - but this precisely necessitated an accurate reconnaissance of each individual country [In reality,] the superstructures of civil society are like the trench-systems of modern warfare. In war it would sometimes happen that a fierce artillery attack seemed to have destroyed the enemy's entire defensive system, whereas in fact it only destroyed the outer perimeter; and at the moment of their advance and attack the assailants would find themselves confronted by a line of defense which was still effective. The same thing happens in politics. [Ref. 6:pp. 238,235]

For Gramsci, the political objective of a social revolution was not capturing the State which was only the outer perimeter of the ruling class' system. Instead, he sought to capture the ideological superstructures of civil society and use them to establish an alternative hegemony. Thus, in the West, he concluded that a lightning frontal attack (i.e., a war of maneuver) on the state apparatus was insufficient because of the secondary line of cultural defense. What was needed was a protracted siege on the hegemonic apparatuses. He advocated that revolutionary forces gradually subvert the ideological organs of hegemony, and erode the entire ideology and culture (i.e., attitudes, prohibitions, myths, values and perspective) of the dominant group. This would leave the ruled free and independent of their rulers. This cultural transformation

¹³This can be seen as a difference between pluralist democracies and autocratic dictatorships. In the former, it is easier to decapitate revolutionary potential without hurting hegemonic rule. In the latter, hegemonic rule must rely heavily on coercion in order to decapitate revolutionary situations.

- destroying one hegemony and creating another - was both a necessary phase and an essential precondition for a successful social revolution.

Gramsci's war of position involved the counterhegemony of the subordinate groups as surrounding the State hegemonic apparatus. Counterhegemony was both a mass organization or movement of the subordinate group and a developing apparatus for subordinate group institutions, ideology and culture. "A social group can, and indeed must, already exercise leadership (i.e., be hegemonic) before winning governmental power (this indeed is one of the principal conditions for the winning of such power)." [Ref. 6:p. 207] After the "war of position" has been won, a war of maneuver can take place, launching an attack on the State apparatus while Gramsci never questioned the role of the armed struggle or its decisive role in achieving ultimate victory. He also did not over-emphasize its importance. The battle for counterhegemony was key to any successful social revolution and the battle of primary importance.¹⁴

3. The Role of Intellectuals

In order to effectively battle the State for the minds of the masses, Gramsci regarded the role of intellectuals as significant. Intellectuals are actively involved in the battle for the mind of the masses, i.e., hegemony. Gramsci defined two types of intellectuals: traditional and organic. Traditional intellectuals are all those traditionally regarded as intellectuals (e.g., artists, scientists, scholars, etc.) and the intellectual remains of previous social formations (e.g., ecclesiastics). Traditional intellectuals tend to function autonomously and are not organically linked to their class or group of origin. Nevertheless, the dominant group can use these intellectuals as part of their hegemonic apparatus, co-opting them to maintain dominant group rule. Organic intellectuals, on the other hand, are directly related or organic to their particular class or group and function to build the hegemony of that class or group.¹⁵ The dominant group, besides its own organic intellectuals can also "reach into the subordinate classes [or groups] for additional intellectuals to give homogeneity and

¹⁴For a more detailed discussion on the wars of position and maneuver see Michael Carnoy's chapter on Gramsci [Ref. 3:pp. 80-85].

¹⁵While Gramsci characterized intellectuals in class-oriented terms, I feel his terms can be extrapolated to nonclass groups. Thus an organic intellectual represents the hegemonic interests of the dominant social division within a particular society to which he belongs. It is just as accurate to say an organic intellectual of the proletarian class represents proletarian hegemony in a bourgeoisie society, as to say a subordinate ethnic group intellectual represents his ethnic group's hegemony in a multiethnic society (e.g., the Soviet Union).

self-awareness to the dominant group." [Ref. 3:p. 85] These organic intellectuals, despite their subordinate group origins, act like dominant group intellectuals. Gramsci also broadened the "organic intellectual" category to include any person who possesses a particular technical or managerial skill. They are the thinking and organizing elements of every class or group. These intellectuals are organic but are distinguished less by profession than by function; they direct and manage the ideas and aspirations of the class or group to which they organically belong. [Refs. 3,5,6:pp. 85-86,355,3] Both groups of intellectuals - traditional and organic - fulfill an intellectual function for civil society, whether for the ruling group or the subordinate group. As a result, they can provide both leadership for the politically active elements of society, as well as motivation for the politically passive elements.

Intellectuals can play one of two roles in society. Some intellectuals serve as "the dominant group's 'deputies' exercising the subaltern functions of social hegemony and political government," while others serve as part of the revolutionary process. [Ref. 6:p. 12] The dominant group, through its political party or parties, attempts to join the traditional intellectuals (from both the dominant and the subordinate groups) with the organic intellectuals of the dominant group. This merger allows the political party or parties of the dominant group to exercise its hegemony. A revolutionary party attempts to achieve a similar goal. It attempts to join together disaffected dominant group intellectuals (both traditional and organic), traditional intellectuals from their subordinate group, and organic intellectuals from the subordinate group - the thinker-organizers of the subordinate group "with a conscious conception of the world that transcends their class interests." [Ref. 3:p. 87] These organic (subordinate group) intellectuals

provided the basis for Gramsci's political strategy [i.e., counterhegemony and a war of position] - the establishment of the proletariat's [or subordinate group's] cultural and moral superiority, independent of its direct political power. [Ref. 3:p. 87]

From this discussion of intellectuals, one can conclude that in a war of position the counterhegemonic army is led by the intellectuals - both traditional and subordinate group organic intellectuals - and its ranks are filled with the organic mass of individuals who no longer adhere to the hegemonic consciousness of the ruling group. This is the army which forms a counterhegemony against the ruling group and forms a revolutionary political party against the State.

In the Soviet Union, the Central Asian Muslim masses are challenging and rejecting the socialist consciousness of the Russian ruling group. These masses, led by traditional intellectuals - Muslim scholars - and organic intellectuals - the unofficial Mullahs of Islamic Sufi orders - are forming a developing counterhegemony against the Russians, the Communist Party, and the Soviet state. A clearer understanding of the hegemony of the Russian nation and especially the Russian Communists in the Soviet Union is the first step in fully comprehending the significance of the Central Asian challenge.

III. RUSSIAN HEGEMONY AND THE SOVIET STATE

Gramsci's theory of hegemony revolves around the cultural and ideological dominance of a ruling social division over a subordinate social division. The key is to identify whether these divisions are horizontal classes or vertical nationalities. In the Soviet Union these divisions are nationalities. The dominant national group, the Great Russians or just Russians, extend a hegemonic rule over the entire Soviet state. The Russians have extended their rule over subordinate nationalities and exert a cultural hegemony over them. In this chapter, two aspects of Gramsci's theory are outlined - dominant social divisions, and Russian hegemony. Gramsci's analysis of the State, his theory of hegemony and his strategy of a revolutionary war of position all point towards one fundamental purpose -- his desire to achieve a successful social revolution against a state. Therefore, it is important to place any revolutionary challenge to a state within the larger context of Gramsci's state theory.

A. DOMINANT SOCIAL DIVISION: NATIONAL GROUPS

The Soviet Union is not a nation-state. Rather, it is a "State of nations." Helene Carrere d'Encausse makes this point clearly in her book *Decline of an Empire*. The Soviet Union "is not a nation so much as an empire, in a world where empires are fading away. In short, it is not the 'state of workers and peasants' it claims to be. The truth is that it is primarily a State of nations." [Ref. 12:p. 11] Therefore, the dominant social division in the Soviet Union is not the horizontal stratification of society into classes, but the vertical stratification of society into national groups. Yet, this stratification runs contrary to Lenin's original conception of civil society.

Lenin, like Marx, saw social stratification of any kind as an abomination. For Lenin the horizontal stratification of society into classes was determined by the particular economic base (or mode of production) of society. In the socialist mode of production, the proletariat together with its class ally, the peasants, would eradicate civil society of any bourgeoisie elements. Thus civil society, dominated by the collective ownership of production, would function under the leadership of the proletariat but be essentially free of horizontal class cleavages or competition. In the Soviet Union today, civil society appears largely absent of strong horizontally based cleavages. While some would argue that the intelligentsia is really a social class, rather

than just the "upper stratum" of the proletariat and peasant classes or that the Communist Party (CPSU) represents a new privileged ruling class,¹⁶ these cleavages do not appear to be the dominant social cleavages. Rather, they reflect interests of national groups rather than collectively forming an independent class.

The stratification of Soviet civil society into vertical divisions is also contrary to Lenin's original conception. Lenin was an internationalist. He believed that nationalism was a social superstructure of capitalist society. Nationalism was, therefore, an outgrowth of private property and served to divide the class-based loyalties of the proletariat. He believed class-based international loyalties would win out over nationality-based loyalties. Yet during the Russian Civil War and its aftermath, the Bolsheviks had to reform their internationalist vision in order to prevent the dissolution of the former Russian empire, which they sought to control. The 1924 USSR constitution formalized the acceptance of national groups and the vertical stratification of society. The 1924 Constitution called for a federal institutional structure and the promotion of national cultures. As Helene Carrere d'Encausse notes

National culture was therefore a double-barrelled concept, one that was perfectly defined by Stalin. These cultures were to be national in form -- principally as to language. But at the same time they were to be socialist in content. What these national languages were to transmit was not each nation's own heritage, but a new heritage shared by all -- socialism, its values and ultimate goals. [Ref. 12:p. 26]

The goal of this political formula for national cultures was the eventual formation of a single Socialist community free from vertical cleavages within civil society.

The current results of Soviet nationality policies have failed to "merge" or "fuse" the various national groups in the Soviet Union. In some cases, even "rapprochement" has been tenuous at best. Despite the declaration of a historic new community -- the "Soviet people" -- by the 1977 Brezhnev Constitution, federalism remained the law of

¹⁶For a contrary position, see Paul M. Sweezy's article, "Is There a Ruling Class in the USSR?" and Charles Bettelheim's book *Class Struggles in the USSR* [Refs. 13,14]. While I agree that the CPSU, especially the Central Committee, has at all times contained the upper strata of Soviet civil society, and forms the basis of the Soviet power elite, I disagree that it supports a case for class-based analysis of the Soviet Union. Rather, as Seweryn Bialer points out in his article, "How Russians Rule Russia," "individuals of Great Russian origin form the absolute majority of the present Soviet elite [i.e., the Central Committee]." [Ref. 15:p. 46] Thus the Communist Party, especially the Central Committee, represents the vertical structuring and control of society according to nationality rather than class. The Central Committee is an instrument of the political elites of the Russian nationality group rather than a separate class. See also Yaroslav Bilinsky's article, "The Rulers and the Ruled" [Ref. 16].

the land -- an expression of national differences. Some scholars see this declaration of a "Soviet people" as more of a normative goal rather than a concrete empirical reality. One scholar asserts that "we are witnessing the reversal of an old Stalinist slogan: the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is increasingly becoming socialist in form, but national in content." [Ref. 17:p. 76] Thus, the Soviet Union instead of developing a stronger socialist culture has in reality strengthened the various national cultures of civil society. In light of this discussion, nationality and national identity continue to exert a tremendous force on Soviet civil society. Therefore, the dominant social division of control and cleavage remains national groups.¹⁷

After describing the Soviet Union as primarily a "State of nations" rather than a nation-state or a "State of classes," a compelling question still exists - "What is a nation?" The term "nation" denotes "a body of people, associated with a particular territory, that is sufficiently conscious of its unity to seek or to possess a government peculiarly its own." [Ref. 22:p. 886] In the Soviet case, each nation does not "possess a government peculiarly its own." Only those nations officially recognized are represented directly by national governments.¹⁸ Yet the power of these national governments is limited by the federal system (especially the federal system of the 1977 Brezhnev Constitution) and ultimately by the Communist Party. According to Stalin, in his book *Marxism and the National Question*, "a nation is an historically evolved, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological makeup [or national character] manifested in a common culture." [Ref. 23:p. 16] Stalin required all four characteristics to be present; otherwise, a nation ceases to be a nation. This definition, as applied by the Soviets, is also inadequate. In the Soviet Union these characteristics are prescribed by the State. One characteristic, territory, has been denied to at least three "nations" (i.e., the Soviet

¹⁷For a more thorough discussion of the major arguments concerning Soviet nationality policy, and federalism see the following works done by Helene Carrere d'Encausse, Gréy Hodnett, Roman Sporluk and Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone [Refs. 12,18,19,20,21]

¹⁸The USSR contains 53 territorial units with a native governmental structure: 15 union republics, 20 autonomous republics, 8 autonomous provinces or oblasts, and 10 national regions or okrugs. Nevertheless, at least three national groups, each numbering over one million people, have not been represented by territorial units -- Germans, Jews and Poles. This lack of official recognition does not negate that these groups are nations.

German, Jewish, and Polish national groups) in order to weaken their national identity. Both of these definitions are inappropriate for our study because they involve attributes that are State controlled as opposed to "people" controlled.

In the Soviet Union, the most important characteristic of a nation is that people feel they are a nation. Seton-Watson also agrees that the center-of-gravity for a defining an nation should lie with the people. He concludes that

A nation exists when a significant number of people in a community consider themselves to form a nation, or behave as if they formed one. It is not necessary that the whole of the population should so feel, or so behave, and it is not possible to lay down dogmatically a minimum percentage of a population which must be so affected. When a significant group holds this belief, it possesses "national consciousness." [Ref. 24:p. 5]

Therefore, it is less important that the Soviet state attribute "national consciousness" to a group of people than that the group of people perceive themselves as a nation. The perception of a "national consciousness" can produce a "we-they" dichotomy.

The simplest statement that can be made about a nation is that it is a body of people who feel that they are a nation To advance beyond it, it is necessary to attempt to take the nation apart and to isolate for separate examination the forces and elements which appear to have been the most influential in bringing about the sense of common identity which lies at its roots, the sense of the existence of a singularly important national "we" which is distinguished from all others who make up an alien "they." This is necessarily an overly mechanical process, for nationalism, like other profound emotions such as love and hate, is more than the sum of the parts which are susceptible of cold and rational analysis. [Ref. 25:p. 102]

This definition of a nation, made by Rupert Emerson in his book *From Empire to Nation: the Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples*, is extremely critical to analyzing national hegemony in the Soviet case. Any empire which functions as a "State of nations" is susceptible to national self-assertions - whether for autonomy within the empire or separation from the empire.¹⁹ A subset of the people of the empire's civil society can form a national consciousness of "we" which opposes a national consciousness of "they." The "we" reject the "they" and distinguish themselves from them. These national consciousnesses do not have to equate simply to ethnic identity and can vary depending on who asks the question "what nationality are you?"

¹⁹The first is called "orthodox" nationalism and "involves the pursuit of political, economic, and cultural autonomy within the system." The second is called "unorthodox" nationalism and is "characterized by advocacy of succession and independence and/or rejection of the system's ideological mold." [Ref. 21:p. 4]

Thus in Central Asia, two Central Asians of different ethnic backgrounds (e.g., one Uzbek and the other Tajik) will probably identify themselves according to their ethnic identities. But when a Russian enters the group, the "we-they" dichotomy becomes transethnic; a Central Asian Muslim national consciousness forms. Now the answer to the question would be "We are Soviet Muslims." In the Soviet Union, it is the Central Asian Muslim national consciousness which forms a counterhegemonic "we" that challenges the hegemony of the Russian "they." But the Russian "they" is the dominant national group and currently is able to rule the Soviet state through its cultural and ideological ascendancy, and through the Communist Party.

B. RUSSIAN HEGEMONY

The Russian nationality dominates the Soviet "State of Nations" and the contrived "Soviet nationalism" which the state tries to foster. The presence of this Russian predominance has been discussed at length by Western scholars, especially in relation to other nationality issues. Nevertheless, this dominance has not been positioned within a larger conception of the Soviet state or state theory. Gramsci's theory of hegemony provides a useful analytic vehicle for that discussion.

1. A Mechanism for Rule

The Soviet Union is a multifaceted actor in the international milieu. Yet, at the center of the Soviet state beats a Russian heart. In fact, the "Russianness" of the Soviet Union shapes the two most important institutional identities of the Soviet Union - the Russian national identity and the Communist Party identity. Each of these institutional identities is an outgrowth of the Russian ideological and cultural hegemony of the Soviet state. [Ref. 26:p. 17]

a. The Russian Nation Identity

The Soviet Union is the successor to the former Russian Imperial Empire.²⁰ This empire did not collapse and die during the 1917 Bolshevik revolution. Rather, it transmuted into the Soviet Union. This point is fundamental to understanding why the Russians are the ruling nationality group in the Soviet Union.

The Great Russian nation was the backbone of Czarist Russia. It extended its colonial control primarily by force - military conquest - over a host of weaker nationality groups. As part of its colonial policy, the Russian culture and values were

²⁰While the Soviet State is technically the direct descendant of the Kerensky Republic of 1917, it is still correct to consider the Soviet State as the successor of the Russian Czarist State.

used to transform minority nationality culture and values. This process - Russification - permitted the Russians to culturally co-opt local masses into accepting Russian rule. Additionally, Russification also allowed co-opted local elites to manage Russian rule in these border areas. Russification is an example of Russian hegemony which sought to assert "Russianness" and assimilate all other minorities. Effective russification permitted the Czar to rule his colonies by "colonial consensus" among the nations who "bought into" the Russian social vision. This colonial consensus allowed the Russian military to revert to a more covert position. But in those colonial areas who rejected Russian assimilation or who sought to assert their contrary national identity, the Russian military actively sought to effect its rule through force and coercion.

After the Bolshevik Revolution, the new Soviet state emerged. But this new state was a transformed version of the old empire. The Soviet Union that emerged was almost identical demographically and territorially to the Russian Empire. The Bolsheviks, through the Civil War struggle, had developed a vested interest in keeping the Russian Empire territorially intact. Rule was asserted through military force and coercion. During these initial years, force and coercion were instrumental for ensuring the continued existence of the transmuted Russian Empire.

The new Soviet Union also reflected the continued presence of Russian Imperial Empire culture. In the Czarist Empire, the Russian culture formed the dominant culture of the land - all other cultures were forced into submission to the Great Russian culture. The Russian culture was the ruling culture; the Russian ideas were the ruling ideas. But the new Soviet Union was more than just the reflection of this Russian predominance.

As the historical and juridical successor to the Russian state, the Soviet Union also functions as the custodian and heir to the interests of the Russian nation, an imperial and traditionally ruling nation. And in this capacity fulfills the role of preserving and extending the values, goals, and interests of historic Russia.
[Ref. 26:p. 16]

As a result, the Soviet Union represents its dominant demographic constituency - the Russian people. This representation is seen in the melding of things Russian with things called "Soviet." But, Russian hegemony is more than just the use of Russian culture for Soviet culture. It also includes an ideological dimension.

b. The Communist Party Identity

The Soviet Union is an ideological state. For Lenin, the Communist Party represented an ideological vanguard of revolutionary proletariat. In Czarist Russia, proletariat were scarce in number. The Russian nation contained the greatest quantity of proletariat and was essential for articulating proletariat interests in the backward non-Russian areas. In Central Asia especially, the Russian-run Tashkent Soviet exerted its "ideological" will over the Muslim nationalists' Kokand government. While the "colonial mentality" of this Soviet was later condemned by the more metropolitan Moscow communists, the damage had been done. Muslim nationalists, alienated by this chauvinism formed the backbone of the Basmachi Revolt of Central Asia.²¹ This Central Asian example shows how a dominant nationality's nationalism, armed with an universalistic ideology like Marxism-Leninism, could use it to justify its nationalistic dominance.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union provided Russians a vehicle for ideological hegemony. Lenin desired the Party to remain above all nationalities. In particular, he wanted to prevent the assertion of Russian nationalism into the Party. But, as Roman Szporluk points out, Lenin never "devised an effective method of curbing Russian nationalism." [Ref. 20:p. 26] The early Communist Party was predominantly Russian. In 1926, 75 percent of the Communist Party membership was Great Russian, and those who were not Russian by origin were Russified [Refs. 20,26:pp. 25,20]. The Bolsheviks' first converts and their main strength rested with the urban-oriented Russian people, especially Russian proletariat.

This initial trend of a nationalist-oriented Communist Party has not died out over the years. According to Mark G. Field, the Russians themselves pioneered "national communism." National communism

may be described as the search, on the part of a nation that has recently emerged as a major world power on the world scene, for a national and cultural identity and rests on the fusion of the doctrinal bases of the Communist movement and identification of the interests of that movement (which is, in essence, supra-national) with the interests of the Russian nation. This fusion was born primarily out of the recognition, on the part of the Soviet leadership by the end of the twenties that no proletariat revolution . . . was in sight . . . and the resulting decision (primarily Stalin's) to build "socialism in one country." From that point on, according to Stalin, Russia was to be considered as the bastion of the Communist movement and, as a corollary, anything that added to the

²¹For more on the initial development of communism in Central Asia see the following: Michael Rywkin's book, Helene Carrere d'Encausse's chapters in Edward Allworth's book, and David Klein's State Department paper. [Refs. 27,28,29]

strength of Russia as a nation (industrialization, for example) was good for the movement. [Ref. 30:p. 196]

In light of Russian national communism, which together with Stalin led to the purging of non-Russian national communists from the Communist Party in the 1930s,²² how would one characterize the Russian revolution and the development of a hegemonic ideology in neo-Gramscian terms?

2. The Russian Revolution and Hegemony

The Russian revolution drastically transformed Russian social and political structures. However, the revolution failed to alter the cultural and political dominance of the State by Russians. As a result, from a neo-Gramscian perspective, the revolution did not remove or eradicate the pre-existing Russian hegemony. Instead, the revolution ushered in a new ideological foundation which enabled Russian hegemony to continue after the revolution.

a. The Hegemonic Role of The Russian Revolution

The Russian revolution radically altered the ideological basis for Russian dominance without radically altering its cultural basis. Hence, the Bolshevik Party and the Communist Party reflect this changed ideology, unchanged culture as national communism. National communism then is a form of hegemony - Russian hegemony - in many ways no different than the Czarist forms. Thus, the dominant social group in the Soviet Union is the same as was in pre-revolutionary Russia and only the ruling faction of that group has changed.²³ The Bolshevik Revolution represents the transfer of State power from one Russian ruling group - the Russian bourgeoisie - to another Russian ruling group - the Russian proletariat (or those who represent the Russian proletariat). To paraphrase Stalin's formula, communism in the Soviet Union is primarily Russian nationalism in form and Socialist in content. But, even its content - socialism - was interpreted through "Russian eyes." One could go so far as to conclude

²²For an excellent source on Muslim national communists, who were originally co-opted into the Party and later purged for their deviationism see [Ref. 31].

²³While the composition of this ruling faction has changed over time, the dominant social group remains Russian. Under the Czars, Russian royalty and bourgeoisie ruled the empire. The Bolsheviks replaced that Russian faction with the CPSC. Today, the CPSC has changed from largely ideologues to a mix of ideologues and technocrats.

that Soviet communism was and is Russian nationalism in form and Russian socialism in content. The Bolsheviks were able to change the content of the Czarist weltanschauung without changing its form. This has allowed

Russian imperial national interests . . . [to be] "internationalized" and advanced in the name of Communism, Russian values . . . [to be] internalized as Marxist canons and imposed upon the non-Russians, as Russian cultural norms "universalized" as Soviet norms, have been adopted and assimilated by non-Russian nationalities. All this has been done in the name of "progress" rather than explicit russification and therefore has been done more effective and permanent. [Ref. 26:p. 17]

Veron Aspaturian highlights how effective this socialist content has been in ensuring continued national dominance. Even today, communist ideologies and historians have been able to justify the need for Russian imperialist conquest of the borderlands ideologically. Russian imperialism, formerly an "absolute evil" and then a "lesser evil," became an "absolute good." Only the socialist content of Marxism-Leninism, as explained by the Party, could justify "the progressive character of tsarist conquest" as an absolute good and a progressive event. The conquest of Russian colonies permitted subordinate nationalities the privilege of coming under a "more advanced Russian culture" and experiencing the "benevolent influence of the Russian people." Therefore, the Russian revolution has allowed continued Russian dominance using a more effective form of rule - socialism - without altering the mechanism - Russian hegemony.

b. The Consequences Of The Russian Revolution

The Russian Revolution has had two often overlooked consequences which a "neo-Gramscian analytic-cut" more fully exposes. First, the Russian Revolution, besides being a social revolution transforming the class structure of Russian civil society and a "top-down" revolution executed by the Leninist vanguard party, was also a passive revolution. Second, the Russian revolution established communism as the theoretical basis for Russian hegemony.

A passive revolution, according to Gramsci, can occur during times of erupting discontent and widespread contradictory consciousness on the practical plane. This situation, referred to as a "decadent hegemony," characterized the Russian empire during the end of the Czarist era and the brief "Kerensky interlude." The Czarist content of ideological and cultural assimilation - russification - was unable to assimilate the conquered territories. Additionally, the Czarist policies proved unable to prevent alienation within its own nationality group. The Bolshevik revolution which pitted

Russian worker against Russian bourgeoisie (i.e., Reds versus Whites) proved largely to be a Russian top-down social revolution. Thus, Russia experienced a social transformation of its horizontal layers which the Russian proletariats were able, through Russian colonialists and military force, to extend throughout the empire. But the Russian revolution was also a passive revolution of the vertical groupings of the empire. This passive revolution involved the reorganization of state power (i.e., Russian state power) and its relationship to the subordinated national groups in order to preserve dominant national group hegemony and to exclude the masses from the ruling political and economic institutions of the State [Ref. 3:p. 76]. Russian State power was reorganized through the Bolshevik revolution. Socialist ideology proved effective at co-opting national elites without allowing ideological dominance, autonomy or independence. Federalism as it developed reflected this changed relationship. Federalism insured the socialist content of this new relationship - relationships among proletariat classes and their class allies only - while it also preserved a Russian form of rule. The Communist Party ensured that this horizontal social revolution and changed content did not weaken the national hegemony of the Russian nation. Lenin observed that the Russian bureaucrat, who pervaded the Communist Party and managed the federal system of government, was essentially a Great Russian chauvinist and not an egalitarian internationalist. [Ref. 12:p. 23] In that light, it would be accurate to say, "scratch a Bolshevik and you will find a Russian nationalist."²⁴ While granted, the Russian Communists were not necessarily actively trying to secure a passive revolution, and some even sought to undermine Russian dominance by sacrificing the Russian state for internationalist goals, the end empirical result of the Russian Revolution was still a passive revolution.²⁵ The Russian passive revolution explains why "Russian

²⁴This statement is a rephrasing of Dostoevsky's characterization of the Russian intelligentsia, written in 1877, "grattez le Russe et vous verrez le Tartare" (scratch a Russian and you will find a Tartar). [Ref. 32:p. 72]

²⁵Sultan Galiev and his Muslim national communism illustrates this point quite well. Sultan Galiev introduced the concept of "proletarian nations" to Marxist theory. Based on Marx's idea of the revenge of "the oppressed" against their "oppressors," Sultan Galiev postulated that the oppressed peoples are the colonized peoples of all classes rather than the proletariat class of Western industrial states. Thus the colonized peoples are all proletarian, even if their industrial proletariat is small in size, the nation is a proletarian nation. Additionally, he concluded that national liberation movements (i.e., the freeing of proletarian nations from their colonial positions) are both progressive and Socialist. By placing primary importance on the national emancipation struggle rather than the class-struggle, he also stressed that the socialist allies of the colonized proletariat are vertically determined (i.e., the other classes within that nation) rather than horizontally determined (i.e., the proletariat classes of other nations, especially the proletariat of former imperial powers). In the Soviet Union, these ideas were threatening to the Russian proletariat who Sultan Galiev felt were

character," "Russian political culture" and "Russian strategic culture" are such useful analytic tools for explaining and predicting the behavior of current Soviet elites.²⁶ The Russian revolution just changed the locus of political power within the ruling group from the bourgeois to the proletariat without changing the hegemonic position of the Russians as the ruling social group.²⁷ In light of this argument, it is fair to describe the Russian revolution as two dimensional: a horizontal dimension - a class-based "top-down" social revolution, and a vertical dimension - a nationality-based revolution without a revolution (i.e., a passive revolution).

The Russian Revolution also provided the Russians with a more effective ideological basis for overcoming the society's contradictory consciousness. It gave the man-on-the-street an ideological consciousness of his practical activity. This ideology explained his practical activity, and as such attempted to reconcile the contradictory consciousness inherent in the old regime. The hegemony of the Czarist state was weakly founded. Imperialism is a weak ideological foundation for affecting consensus rule. Russification for the masses only antagonized them by superimposing an obviously foreign culture. On the other hand, an ideology like socialism proved more useful for the Russians. The newly formed Soviet state was confronted with ethnic problems, competing nationalisms and the general disintegration of Russian dominance. Theodore H. VonLaue, in analyzing the Communist treatment of the "nationality question" in the new Bolshevik state, observes that Russian hegemony was maintained via a fundamental ideological paradox.

unqualified to lead the Socialist revolution. In a colonial empire like Russian and the Soviet Union, such ideas challenged the continued national hegemony of the Russian people. Galiev even proposed that the true revolutionary center-of-gravity lay not with Russians but with Soviet Muslims and that the correct direction of the Russian Revolution was East to Asia through Muslims rather than West to Europe through Russians. Mir Sultan Galiev was purged by Stalin along with other non-Russian national communists. Despite the rehabilitation of so many of these non-Russian national communists, and even Muslim national communists since 1956, Sultan Galiev remains unrehabilitated. His ideas, called "Sultangalievism" remain a powerful native Muslim ideological threat to the Russian socialist hegemony. [Ref. 33:pp. 400-401] For more information on Muslim national communism see [Refs. 31,33].

²⁶For an excellent article on Russian nationalism's transmutation to Soviet communism and the effects this has on Soviet foreign policy see Adam Ulam's chapter on "Russian Nationalism" [Ref. 34].

²⁷Gramsci recognized that changes in the locus of political power within a ruling group occurred. The democratic pluralist societies of the West were proof - one party wins, another loses but the power remains within the bourgeoisie class. In the Soviet case, this change in locus was caused by a social revolution (not an election), was relatively permanent, and involved a class-based political party.

The Communists encouraged spontaneity only to take away its substance in the name of a higher social order which pretended to grant all that had been originally desired (and more). In reality it [i.e., this paradox] turned out to be a more efficient version of Russian domination. [Ref. 32:p. 168]

This paradox attempted to resolve the contradictory consciousness that existed under Czarist imperialism by appealing to an ideological ideal, namely a higher social order. As a result, through socialism and the communist ideology, the Soviet regime both maintained Russian rule, and established a greater degree of regime legitimacy (i.e., social consensus) than the Czarist empire enjoyed.²⁸

Marxism-Leninism, as an ideological basis for rule, is quite effective for system-building. The old empire was crumbling apart, and various rebellious nationality groups were fragmenting the state. The Marxism expounded by Lenin and then more fully integrated back into Russian culture allowed the Russian Revolution to change the horizontal layers of society without eradicating the dominance of Russian nationalism. Alfred G. Meyer has postulated that all revolutions can be divided into three distinct phases: system-destruction, an interregnum period, followed by a system-building phase [Ref. 35:p. 7]. System-building allows for the development of a new social order for civil society. The new regime must create new social institutions to organize and manage society. The political superstructure of society must establish their legitimacy within society (such as the Communist Party). In developing legitimacy, these superstructures begin to rely less and less on terror and coercion to affect their rule. Lastly, system-building

entails the creation and institution of social traditions and social myths, which take the form of systematic and articulate "official" doctrine and must also be seen in doctrinal taboos, that is, unmentionable topics glossed over or left out of the official ideology. [Ref. 35:p. 7]

The communist ideology allowed this type of system-building to proceed and shaped its course [Ref. 35:p. 7]. The set of social traditions and myths, ushered in by the Russian Revolution, justified the elevated and preferred position of things "Russian" throughout the multiethnic state as part of the new official doctrine, Marxism-Leninism.

²⁸While communism is more effective than imperialism as an ideological basis - at least in the short run - communist ideology may prove as ineffective as imperialist ideology in overcoming civil society's contradictory consciousness in the long run.

The communist ideology legitimized Russian hegemony in non-nationality terms, while allowing Russian hegemony to fuse with Communist culture into something called

"Soviet," in which either form or content is Russian depending upon time and circumstance, and in this manner, Russian goals and values are imposed upon the non-Russian population in the name of science, progress, and historical inevitability [Ref. 26:p. 16].

As a result, the ruling group, the Russian nationalists operating through the Communist Party, now had an ideology capable not only of legitimizing rule, but also capable of recruiting support. Thus, the new Soviet state which Lenin and Stalin built fulfilled a basic requirement for hegemony: with it the ruling group "not only justifies and maintains its dominance, but manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules." [Ref. 4:p. 244] With Communism as a national hegemonic ideology, the Soviet State can and does affect Russian hegemonic rule.

3. The Soviet State: Hegemonic Apparatuses

The Soviet State is the primary hegemonic apparatus for Russian nationalism and Russian communism. Yet, the Soviet State is not a perfect reflection of Gramscian state theory. Gramsci defined the State as comprising two superstructural levels - political society and civil society. Thus through both - political hegemony and civil hegemony - rule is maintained and the State can encompass - overtly or covertly - all hegemonic institutions. In the Soviet Union, this sort of division is overly simplistic. As a socialist state, the economic base or infrastructure of the Soviet Union is public property. Therefore, Gramsci's view of civil society as "all those organisms called private" is misleading in the Soviet Union. Additionally, Gramsci's view of political society as a superstructure comprised of all public institutions is also misleading. Gramsci divided the hegemonic struggle between these two superstructures, attributing coercion to public institutions and consensus building to private institutions

a. The Soviet State: A Modified Gramscian Approach

A more apt view of the Soviet Union, using a modification of Gramsci's theory, begins with an understanding of public property. The socialist mode of production classifies all property except personal property as publicly owned property

and outlaws privately owned property.²⁹ As a result, the traditional Gramscian institutions of civil society - all privately owned - are in fact Soviet public property. With this publicization of private property, civil society is no longer the "transmission belt" of hegemonic ideas and values. This function has transferred to political society. Civil society's institutional collapse leaves only three remaining private structures: the individual, who can still choose to accept or reject hegemonic rule; those private institutions largely outside of the ruling group control such as the family unit; and those institutions which oppose hegemonic values and have not been silenced by coercion such as dissent groups and underground "parallel" structures (i.e., unregistered churches, and Islamic Sufi orders which "parallel" state-run churches and Muslim mosques). These three structures, therefore represent the remnants of civil society in the Soviet Union.

With Gramsci's division of hegemonic labor between two superstructures theoretically compromised by Soviet civil society's institutional collapse, Soviet political society has had to broaden its hegemonic role. The public owned institutions must now perform both hegemonic roles: a transmission belt for developing a mass consensus to hegemonic rule - an educator role, and an overt coercive force acting as a vehicle of enforcement, punishment, and threat against those resisting hegemony - a dictatorship role. Thus both roles are performed by the Soviet political superstructure.

Political society in the Soviet Union has an added dimension not envisioned by Gramsci. Political society is a bifurcated superstructure - part Communist Party, and part State structure or bureaucracy. Both parts parallel one another and reflect a division of labor between policy initiation and supervision by the Party and policy implementation by the State bureaucracy. Each part attempts to fulfill both hegemonic roles, with the Party emphasizing the educatorship role, and the State emphasizing the dictatorship role.³⁰ Government, at the apex of the Soviet State

²⁹In the Soviet Union, three categories of property are recognized as legal: state-owned property and collective-owned property, and personal property. The first two categories are just forms of public property. The third category, personal property, is the last remnant of private property and is quite limited in scope. Personal property describes all property which is a direct extension of the individual person and includes among other things - a personal toothbrush, food items, home furniture, and an automobile. The accumulation of too much personal property becomes classified as private property and is therefore illegal.

³⁰The Party exercises political power (i.e., *sil*) in the Soviet Union. As a result, the Party monopolizes communist ideology and Soviet culture. These two elements are essential to Russian hegemony over the "State of nations." While the ideology was originally German, it is interpreted and reinterpreted by a Russian dominated political party who exercises sole dominion over "politics." Soviet culture became the actual

structure, is controlled by the political regime which in the Soviet case is largely the Politburo of the CPSU. The Politburo, through democratic centralism, affects its rule downward over the dual superstructures of Soviet political society - the Party superstructure and the State bureaucratic superstructure - and over the masses of Soviet civil society. The 1977 Brezhnev Constitution concept of "Soviet political system" is congruent with this representation of the State in neo-Gramsci terms. This discussion of the Soviet State, now defined in neo-Gramscian terms, permits a clearer understanding of the hegemonic apparatus of Russian national dominance.

b. The Hegemonic Apparatuses

The hegemonic apparatuses of the Soviet Union are the dual superstructures of Soviet political society. The first superstructure is the CPSU. The primary hegemonic apparatus of the CPSU is its ideology. Most authors today discuss Soviet ideology with a view towards foreign policy. Yet, ideology is extremely vital for hegemonic rule. As stated earlier, the primary architects of Soviet ideology were Russian national communists. The early vanguard party was as much a reflection of Russian chauvinism as it was of its ideology. "From the very beginning of the Soviet regime," observes Helene Carrere d'Encausse, "many features of historical tradition and Russian culture have impregnated the Soviet interpretation of Marxism." [Ref. 12:p. 274] The influences of successive leaders have done little to eradicate that influence. The Communist Party and its ideology continue to legitimize Russian dominance as the "most equal among equals," and as the "elder brother." As a result, the CPSU as a vanguard party has elevated the Russian nation to the status of a "vanguard nation."

A primary domestic mission of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is internal unity around a Russian national form of communism. Communist ideology is intertwined with Russian hegemony. The Russian language is the "lingua franca" or "the language of international communication" in the Soviet Union. Language is an important part of national identity and national consciousness; it has been called the "the touchstone of national identity." [Ref. 26:p. 16] Despite the practical reasons for making Russian the State language (e.g., the need for over one hundred nations to have a common tongue to communicate with), it has linguistically asserted to

extension of Russian culture throughout civil society. The Party serves to motivate, encourage and educate civil society towards ideology and culture. On the other hand, the State bureaucracy exercises political authority (i.e., *vlast*). It administers this authority over civil society through public institutions. While these roles do not reflect a true division of hegemonic labor, they do reflect a difference in hegemonic emphasis.

non-Russians that the Soviet Union is a Russian state. Here again, the integration of the "State of nations" revolves around a symbol of Russian identity.³¹ Russian literacy serves as a "transmission belt" for Russian culture and Marxist ideology. Additionally, ideology justifies the development of a new man, a Soviet man free from nationalistic trappings. The development of "Soviet men" is essential for complete unity and assimilation of all Soviet nations into one Soviet nation. Yet, as Vernon Aspaturian interprets the situation, this new Soviet man is really just a Communist Russian or a Communist russianized non-Russian.

The vaunted "new Soviet man" allegedly emerging in Soviet society appears to be a little more than an intensely more nationally conscious Russian in the Russian areas of the country and a more or less russianized non-Russian in other areas. As a consequence, not only the Russians but the non-Russians are "more Russian" than they ever were under the overtly imperial Russian state of the tsars. [Ref. 26:p. 19]

Therefore, the CPSU acting as an hegemonic apparatus and using ideological arguments has created an image of the ideal Soviet citizen, who appears more Russian than Soviet.

While the Communist Party tends to ideologically base and initiate Russian hegemony, the State superstructure actually implements hegemony. The State bureaucratic superstructure fulfills several roles. It serves as the "armor of coercion" for hegemonic rule. Such public institutions as the army, the police and the judiciary are part of the coercive arm of this superstructure. The State's distribution of ministerial powers more towards the center (rather than the periphery), as well as the new juridical goals of federalism (in the 1977 Constitution) as "the unifier of all the nations and nationalities for building communism" are examples of state structures promoting assimilation [Ref. 12:p. 122]. State institutions also perform a socializing role, attempting to further integrate Soviet nationalities. Examples of these are the universal state education system, the censored Soviet press, and the conscription policies of the Soviet military.³² Lastly, the State's command economy, which has served to propel a backward empire to the modern age, is a hegemonic structure as well. After all, any institution which serves to justify the rule of the dominant group

³¹For a detailed look at the use of Russian in the Soviet Union as a tool for national integration and Russian hegemony see [Refs. 12,26:pp. 165-189, 17-19].

³²For more on these socializing institutions - the state structure, the education system, the press, and military conscription - see [Ref. 12:pp. 121-189].

and extend that rule through consensus is by definition an hegemonic structure. Therefore, Soviet modernization, the increase in technical efficiency of the economic infrastructure, has itself created a common self interest in more modernization, which can draw diverse nations together. Brian Silver, in arguing for a greater scholarly emphasis on the nonadversary aspects of Soviet nationality relations,³³ emphasizes "the existence of certain shared values among peoples of the USSR, above all the commitment to economic development." [Ref. 36:p. 73] Zbigniew Brezinski argues a similar point, that the gradual assimilation of non-Russians to Russian hegemony will occur as a result of their modernization. He identifies engineers, technicians, and scientists as the major assimilationists in all national groups. These assimilationists maintain close relations with Russians.³⁴ For Brezinski, if economic growth continues, then the Soviet Union will continue to enjoy both greater assimilation and greater russification. [Ref. 37:p. 80] From the above discussion, Russian hegemony is both ideologically based, culturally derived and largely State implemented. Hegemony, then, serves as the basic mechanism of Soviet rule, and it is a hegemony based - to some degree - on social consensus, not social conflict. Consensus, then, serves as the basis of Soviet rule.

4. The Soviet State: Consensus and Coercion.

Gramsci's entire theory of hegemony is based on a "consensus model of society." While the State may use coercion against fringe elements and those who dissent, oppose or resist State authority, this is not the primary method for State rule. Thus Gramsci reversed the Leninist emphasis on the State as a dictator. Gramsci also dismissed infrastructural reasons for the longevity of bourgeois rule and the passivity of Italy's proletariat. As a result, he discounted the role of State as a modernizer. "Modernizer" means that the State has increased the technical efficiency with which it

³³The "adversary model" of Soviet nationality policy assumes an inherent conflict between Russian interests and non-Russian or regional populations. Thus Russian hegemony is always "conflictual" and non-Russians tend to resist pressures to assimilate and lose autonomy. The "nonadversary model" assumes a commonality of interest shared among the various Soviet nations. While Russian interests may dominate, these interests are not necessarily ethnocentric nor in opposition with non-Russian interests. [Ref. 36:p. 73]

³⁴Gramsci considered engineers, technicians, and scientists as part of the organic intelligentsia of the various groups within civil society. They were the "thinker-organizers" who were the leaders in the counterhegemonic movement. The dominant group, as in the Soviet Union, relied on the support of these organic intellectuals to maintain their hegemony. Today, despite the assimilation of these elements of the organic thinker-organizers, other organic intellectuals still remain unassimilated to lead a counterhegemonic movement.

uses its economic base or infrastructure (i.e., the increased maximization of both quantity and quality of output from a specific mode of production). Gramsci places his emphasis on the educator role of a state. While the State will always rely on a dictatorship, it will try and rely on an educatorship through hegemony.

In analyzing the Soviet case, however, each of these three roles plays a critical importance. The Soviet Union is a dictatorship - ultimately, but it is also a modernizer and an educatorship as well. The primary role in Stalinist times was the dictator role as seen by the repetitive purges and the use of State terror. But Stalin's dictatorship permitted both the modernization of backward nationalities and the State as a whole, as well as the ideological transmutation of Russian nationalism into communist ideology.³⁵ Modernization has developed a consensus between the State and civil society based on economic development. Additionally, ideology has to some degree reshaped the thinking of Soviet civil society. Thus ideology serves to legitimize Soviet actions and rule. In a conflict model of society, legitimation is a mute issue and not really required or sought. But the Soviets continue to rely on ideological reasoning to justify domestic and foreign policy. Even if one assumes civil society is largely apathetic towards ideology, that does not discount a consensus model for Soviet civil society; it only weakens the consent. Lastly, the modernization of society is itself enough to produce consensus. Civil society "buys into" the dominant value system and culture because it experiences the fruit of that hegemony's economic development. Therefore, it is safe to say that Russian hegemonic rule through Russian communism is largely consensual rather than purely conflictual³⁶

With the Soviet State defined in neo-Gramscian terms as an hegemony, then any successful revolutionary challenge must begin as a counterhegemony. Only via a counterhegemony can a subordinate national group hope to overcome Soviet rule.

³⁵Stalin's rule, while strongly emphasizing the coercive power of the State (i.e., the State as a dictatorship), also prepared the Soviet State for large scale economic development and educated civil society with regards to communist ideology (i.e., the State as both a modernizer and as an educator). Stalin's era laid the foundation for developing consensus rule. Thus the lack of utility for a "totalitarian model" describing the Soviets after 1956, has given way to a broader, more pluralist view.

³⁶While the major portion of Russian hegemonic rule is effected by consensus as opposed to conflict, Russian hegemonic rule still remains a mix of both of these elements. The presence of both consensus and conflictual elements within a particular state is compatible with Gramscian theory. Gramsci himself never specified an exact mix, only that consensus was greater than conflict. Gramsci recognized that hegemonic situations vary in intensity from state to state. While Soviet hegemony is not necessarily "successful" or "integral" hegemony and may in fact be proceeding towards a state-wide "decadent" variety, the dominant model for Soviet society is still consensus rule, and not conflict rule.

Therefore, despite Paul Goble's assertion that "given the disproportion between the organizational, ideological, and coercive resources of the Soviet state and those of the nationalities in the USSR, the task of managing national relations has usually not been impossible" [Ref. 38:p. 83], it may, in fact, prove otherwise. A counterhegemony is growing in Central Asia which may in reality make this task impossible.

IV. THE SOVIET CENTRAL ASIAN CHALLENGE: COUNTERHEGEMONY

The Soviet Central Asian challenge is a complex phenomena, and represents the strongest geographic region of Muslim resistance to Soviet rule today. The challenge itself is a counterhegemonic movement based on a Muslim culture and ideology quite contrary to Russian national communism. The Western literature has characterized this challenge as ethnic unrest, failed Soviet nationality policy, and as an Islam revival movement - but never as a counterhegemonic movement. Nevertheless, a neo-Gramscian framework provides the proper theoretical perspective to describe and explain this phenomena. The purpose of this chapter is to apply Gramsci's theories to the Central Asian challenge. From the theoretical perspective established in Chapter Two, a counterhegemonic movement must establish a "counter-culture" capable of creating a contradictory consciousness among civil society, overcoming the dominant group's hegemony and eventually surrounding the hegemonic apparatuses of the State. In Soviet Central Asia today, three forces form the basis of the counterhegemony: Muslim population growth, the strength of Islamic religious practices and the national identity of the Central Asians. These three "counterhegemonic forces" are supported by three "counterhegemonic apparatuses" - the Muslim family, "unofficial" Mullahs and Central Asian Muslim intellectuals. Lastly, Gramsci's theories point to one goal - social revolution. In evaluating the current counterhegemonic challenge, one must also analyze the "counterhegemonic prospects" for the future.

A. COUNTERHEGEMONIC FORCES

Three key forces form the basis of Central Asia's developing counterhegemony: population growth, Islam, and national identity. The literature is full of evidence and analysis on these three forces and their corresponding components such as: a Central Asian labor surplus, Soviet Sufism, Russian language literacy, nationality power, and Muslims in the military. This section will not attempt to prove the validity of these issues, but rather using the works of foremost Western scholars, outline some of the key particulars.³⁷

³⁷Currently, the single-best short discussion of these Central Asian issues is

1. Muslim Population Growth

Currently the entire Soviet population is experiencing a shrinking growth rate. From 1970 to 1979, according to official Soviet census for those years, the average growth of the Soviet population as a whole slowed to 0.92 percent per year. However, during this period the Muslim population experienced a population boom. The Muslim peoples of the Soviet Union collectively managed the highest growth rate at 2.17 percent per year, while the Russian population slowed down to 0.7 percent per year. [Ref. 2:p. 125] Soviet Central Asia accounted for 30 percent of all Soviet population growth.³⁸ By the year 2000, Central Asia is expected to account for 50 percent of the Soviet population growth. [Refs. 44,45:pp. 40-41, 3] If the Muslim population growth continues at a relatively constant rate,³⁹ by the year 2000 the total population of the Soviet Union will be 300 to 310 million, with 66 to 75 million Muslims (or 22 to 25 percent of the total Soviet population). Approximately 50 million Muslims will be concentrated in Central Asia forming an extremely strong Muslim-Turkic minority in Moscow's peripheral region.⁴⁰

This fertility rate differential between Muslims and Slavs in the Soviet Union is reflective of more fundamental cultural differences. Slavs, especially Russian Slavs, associate an improved standard of living with improved material conditions. Therefore,

Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone's article "Islam and Nationalism: Central Asia and Kazakhstan Under Soviet Rule" [Ref. 39]. Additionally, Michael Rywkin's book, *Moscow's Muslim Challenge*, and the Bennigsen and Broxup book, *The Islamic Threat to the Soviet Union*, serve as excellent overview sources for understanding these counterhegemonic issues. [Refs. 2,27]. For those desiring a deeper understanding of the historical background of these forces see [Refs. 1,28,40,41]. Lastly, the most current general works to date on these issues or related issues are [Refs. 42,43].

³⁸Uzbekistan alone accounted for 20 percent of the total Soviet population growth during this period.

³⁹Some Soviet experts disagree with this assumption. They predict the Soviet Muslim birth rate will decline over time. One such expert is Ye. D. Grazhdannikov (see [Ref. 46:pp.100-101]). This view is not widely accepted, especially in the West.

⁴⁰The Russian population, by the year 2000, is expected to grow between 150 million and 175 million. The higher number (i.e., 175 million) accounts for projected non-demographic additions to the Russian population through the assimilation of non-Russian national groups. The three Slavic ethnic groups (i.e., Great Russian, White Russians or Belorussians, and Little Russians or Ukrainians) will account for a little over 200 million to 225 million people (includes assimilated non-Russian Russians). [Ref. 2:pp. 130-131] However, the republics of Central Asia proper had a 1979 population of 25,483,000 people of whom only 3,108,000 are Slavs (or 12 percent). Therefore, the Slavic population is not only declining in growth, but is also a small - but powerful - minority in this region. (Based on [Ref. 27:pp. 62-63].) Additionally, almost all of the titular nationalities of Central Asia proper live in Central Asia; 99.3 percent of the Uzbeks, 99.0 percent of the Kirghiz, 99.2 percent of the Tajiks and 97.8 percent of the Turkomens live in Soviet Central Asia [Ref. 2:p. 127].

a natural result of this cultural perspective is the deliberate planning of small families. This reduces family expenses and allows for more disposable "rubles." The Slavic peoples living in a predominately urban oriented environment (i.e., Western USSR) bordering on a consumer society, have chosen "the good life" over having children. [Ref. 27:p. 65] While the Soviet State as a "modernizer" has led to a decline in Slavic births based on Slavic cultural values, the Muslim population had not "bought into" that part of Russian cultural hegemony.

The Muslim population has maintained its traditional cultural values and norms with regard to the family. Therefore, Central Asians look upon large families as proof of "the good life." Solomon Bruk, a leading Soviet demographer, attributes this pattern to the survival of traditional marital-sexual habits, including Muslim community pressure against both divorce and childless marriages. This cultural differential is further highlighted by the commitment of Muslim fathers to their families. A Muslim father spends 2.5 times as much time with his family as a Russian father spends with his family. [Ref. 27:p. 66] Additionally, according to a 1977 Soviet statistical source, Russian mothers are expected to have about two children.⁴¹ On the other hand, the same study showed no one statistical peak for Muslim women. Rather, the data reflected a relatively consistent response increase: fifteen percent of the Muslim mothers wanted four children, another fifteen percent wanted five children, and so on through nine-plus children. Therefore, about 85 percent of the Muslim women expected to have a large family of four or more children, while 90 percent of the Russian women expected never to have a family larger than four children, and most of these Russian women expected to have small families (i.e., zero to two children). These very different cultural perspectives on the family have shaped demographic differentials like these: a gross reproduction rate between 2.15 and 2.91 for the Central Asian republics (1978-1979), versus 0.93 to 1.00 gross reproduction rates for all-Slavic republics during the same period. [Ref. 27:pp. 65-66, 70] Therefore, while Russian hegemony has permitted dominant group rule, it has not erased all cultural differences within Soviet society. Muslim family values appear to lie largely outside Russian hegemony and shape the demographic element of Central Asian counterhegemony.

⁴¹Sixty percent of the Russian women surveyed expected to have two children, while the complete range of expectations was between zero (childless) and four children.

2. Soviet Islam

Much of the Soviet Muslim value system remains heavily influenced by Islam. In 1979, a high-ranking Soviet Party official admitted in *Kommunist* "that Islam, contrary to all expectations of the Soviet leadership, is more deeply rooted than any other religion or confession in the Soviet Union." [Ref. 47:p. 115] Additionally, he thought that Islamic traditions and customs were especially tenacious. Soviet Muslims today adhere strongly to "ancient traditions" and "age-old customs" such as the "traditional life cycle rituals" of a Muslim's life.

These traditions and customs to a great extent go hand in hand with, or are even identical to, the religious codes of conduct to which Muslims, in the "brotherhood of all true believers," are subject . . . today nearly all [Soviet] Muslims have their sons circumcised, that the celebration of Ramadan is nearly universal, that marriages according to Islamic rites (immediately after the civil ceremony) are still widespread, and that there is even a demand on the part of large sections of the community for burial in Islamic cemeteries, with the result that such funerals are commensurately common. In the "godless" environment of Marxist-Leninist ideology, particularly great significance is to be attributed to the practice of religious convictions in this form. [Ref. 47:p. 119]

The majority of Soviet Muslims still pursue life cycle rituals, and "the Muslim way of life," which includes several customs that favor large families. These customs include strict Muslim sexual morality, the early marriages of daughters, the traditional Islamic ban of birth control, "the payment of kalym [bride price], polygamy (camouflaged, of course), extreme respect of the elders (aqsaqalism), religious marriage, circumcision, and all religious burials." [Ref. 11:pp. 119, 127] Traditional life cycle rituals are widely observed in both rural and urban areas, even among the intelligentsia and important party members. These rituals mark the Muslim consciousness of Central Asians (and all Soviet Muslims). As a result, despite official Soviet opposition to circumcision, the entire weight of Muslim social opinion makes this ritual almost universal. Therefore, circumcision is a symbol of Muslimhood and in all areas of Central Asia one can hear illiterate elders and young educated men state "he who is not circumcised is not an Uzbek" (or a Turkmen, or a Tajik, etc. as appropriate). The presence and practice of these rituals reflect the strong influence of Muslim social consciousness (i.e., a Muslim "we"), as well as the effectiveness of social and family pressure in overcoming russianized Soviet culture. Additionally, these traditional attitudes also contribute to the lack of Muslim marital "internationalization" (i.e., the breakdown of national identity through ethnic intermarriage), and the continued influence of a Muslim social

consciousness to each succeeding generation. [Ref. 39:pp. 48-51] Even Muslim atheists and official non-believers follow, in varying degrees, these religious based rituals, evidencing the broader national implication of the Islamic religion.⁴²

Part of Islam's survival as both a faith and a way of life can be explained by the presence of official Islam. Official Islam represents the "adaptive style" of Islam where religious leaders adapt to and compromise with the State when it is necessary for the maintenance of Islam. As a result, this "adaptive style" is still orthodox despite its liberalized practice. [Ref. 48:p. 146]

From the standpoint of Islamic law and theology, Islam in the USSR is the same unadulterated, pure religion that it had been before 1917, and its leaders, though formally submissive to the godless Soviet regime, have never been accused by anyone - friends or adversaries - of heresy (shirk), infidelity (kufr), or even innovation (bida). [Ref. 49:p. 39]

As a result, official Soviet Islam remains an accepted member of the worldwide Islamic milieu.

Official Islam, since the end of World War II has enjoyed an ambiguous position in the Soviet Union similar to that of Russian Orthodoxy:

On the one hand, the Soviet Communist Party has sought to eradicate this faith [Islam] in campaigns of varying intensity. On the other hand, the Muslim leaders have judged it expedient to give full support to Soviet policies as the price for the continued existence of their institutions. [Ref. 50:p. 429]

Official Islam is represented by the muftis of four Muslim Spiritual Boards, the largest and most influential being in Tashkent, and representing Central Asian Muslims. Originally, official Islam was to serve two roles for Russian hegemony. First, it was to serve the Soviet Union abroad as regime propagandists. Secondly, it was to serve as a "transmission belt" for Soviet ideology and a guarantor of Muslim loyalty to the State.

⁴²In the Soviet Union, only about 20 percent of the Muslims declare themselves as atheists. The remainder - 80 percent - represent various levels of belief: "by personal conviction, by tradition, or under the pressure of the family milieu." [Ref. 11:p. 127]. But even official atheists continue to practice the three basic Islamic rites: circumcision, Islamic marriage, and Islamic burial.

According to all recent surveys, these family rites are performed by 95 to 99 percent of the Muslim population. The survey reveals this curious phenomenon and lends support to the theory that absolute atheists do not exist in Muslim lands. [Ref. 2:p. 1]

However, the role of official Islam has grown beyond these two. Today, official Islam no longer sees itself in opposition to Soviet ideology, or intellectually inferior to it. Rather, official Islam traces socialism back directly to Islamic roots - communism did not begin with the works of Marx, Engels, and Lenin. During an Islamic conference of the Muslims in Tashkent in September 1970, a leading participant stated:

I admire the genius of the prophets who proclaimed the social principles of socialism. I am pleased that a large number of socialist principles are nothing other than the realization of Muhammad's instructions. [Ref. 47:p. 119]

Therefore, official Islam today is not only supporting communism, but supplanting its European and Russian roots with Islamic roots, and undercutting Russia's role as a "vanguard nation." Additionally, official Islam has adapted Islamic institutions to the realities of Soviet life, thus allowing Muslims to actively participate in State and Party social organizations without acting in a manner contrary to Koranic norms. These "new" Islamic institutions, therefore, tend to preserve, not eradicate, the Islamic heritage of all Soviet Muslims. [Ref. 47:p. 118] Lastly, Soviet muftis are maintaining

the existence of a skeletal but necessary religious establishment . . . and guarantee[ing] the survival of Soviet Islam by preserving its purity and its high intellectual level . . . Without such a framework, the conservative, underground Islam would relapse into ignorance, superstition and shamanism. [Ref. 11:p. 129]

Therefore, the presence of official Islam permits the practice of a effective, more powerful Islam: unofficial Islam.⁴³

"Underground," "unofficial," "parallel," or "popular" Islam represents the illegal Islam practiced by Soviet civil society. While the Spiritual Boards administer "official" Islam, mystical Sufism administers "parallel" Islam.⁴⁴ Sufism is not a sect, a heresy, or a schismatic Islamic movement; rather, it is the mystical face of orthodox Islam. Alexander Bennigsen concludes that Islam in the Soviet Union has survived primarily because of "the resistance offered by the well-organized and dedicated

⁴³Interestingly enough, despite continuous efforts of Soviet authorities to use official Islam against "unofficial" Islam, Soviet Muslim muftis do not condemn parallel, underground Islam as illegal, and no serious conflict has occurred between the two. [Ref. 11:p. 129]

⁴⁴For a detailed and thorough discussion of Soviet Sufism, see the December 1983 special edition of *Central Asian Survey* (volume 2, number 4) which is dedicated to the subject.

representatives of the conservative 'parallel Islam' rather than because of the activity of the official Muslim establishment, which is loyal to the Soviet regime." [Ref. 51:p. 82] Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay echoes this conclusion and states

Islam survives in the USSR mainly because of the existence of what is termed "parallel" or "unofficial" Islam, a complex underground secret or semi-secret establishment which is much better organized and more dynamic than the official Muslim hierarchy. [Ref. 52:p. 5]

Thus, unofficial Islam performs a vital role which has insured the continued presence of an Islamic faith and an Islamic way of life in the Soviet Union.

Parallel Islam is essential not only to the Islamic identity of Soviet Muslims but also to their Islamic revival. In pre-Soviet times, "much of the practice of Islam was performed outside of the mosque by Sufi brotherhoods." [Ref. 39:p. 44] However, during the Stalinist era, most people retreated from openly practicing Islam. Not until the 1960's and 1970's do Central Asian Soviet sources reveal the expansion of Sufism among Turkomans, Uzbek, Kazakhs and Karakalpaks [Ref. 52:p. 17]. Today it is not uncommon to find Soviet sources discussing the revival of Soviet Islam and Sufi influence. In July 1979, the First Secretary of the Turkmenistan Communist Party spoke about "the growing influence of Islam." [Ref. 47:p. 120] The Soviet press makes numerous attacks on "the activities of 'self-appointed' (or 'nonregistered') mullahs, clandestine religious schools and illegal mosques run by adepts of the Sufi orders, and the activity surrounding 'holy places'."⁴⁵ [Ref. 53:pp. 31-32] Additionally, these Sufi brotherhoods represent a closed, non-Soviet society. In fact, the adepts live practically outside the Soviet society. Sufi organizations have even succeeded, in some cases, of infiltrating and dominating traditional institutions: guilds, clan courts, and the village assemblies. One Soviet source in 1973 even asserts that "not infrequently illegal clan courts reverse the decisions of Soviet Justice." [Ref. 52:pp. 20, 33(n25)] Additionally, Sufi orders operate unofficial prayer houses, perform the life cycle rituals and community rites and represent the "non-mosque" trend. The presence of Sufi "mullahs" or "ishans" who are more numerous than official mullahs, is essential to the growth of Islam in the Soviet Union. These Sufi leaders and their orders not only serve as a "counterhegemonic apparatus" (to be discussed later), but also allow Islam to be a

⁴⁵These Central Asian "holy places" are usually associated with a former Sufi saint and serve as centers for domestic pilgrimages [Ref. 53:p. 32].

"counterhegemonic issue." Through "unofficial" Islam, "the Islamic weltanschauung [of Central Asians] not only survives but seems to have experienced a revival." [Ref. 39:p. 44]

Sufism also represents a counterhegemonic issue in its own right - beyond just encouraging an Islamic counter-culture. Sufism "is intolerant (Soviet sources use the expression 'fanatic'), conservative, anti-modernistic, anti-Occidental, violently anti-Russian and, finally, anti-Communist." [Ref. 11:p. 129] The small, decentralized, closed Sufi societies or tariqa "represents the hard core of anti-Russian and anti-communist sentiments, . . . [and] conduct permanent intense religious and nationalistic propaganda." [Ref. 52:p. 29] Sufi orders represent the only social and political mass organization in Central Asia other than the Communist Party. They have a long history of clandestine resistance to Russian rule and political activity. Although Sufism has no "political program," it formed the backbone of various Central Asian rebellions - including the Basmachi revolt of the 1920s and 1930s. In fact, "the prestige of Sufi brotherhoods is greatest where resistance to the infidels [i.e., Russians] was most energetic" like the Ferghana Valley and Southern Turkmenistan [Ref. 52:p. 25]. Additionally, the tariqa in some areas are closely tied to extended families and clans. Several Soviet sources estimate that nearly 50 percent of the Sufi followers join the tariqa for family reasons, 25 percent due to personal conviction and the remaining 25 percent due to unknown reasons. Today one finds a growing proportion of intellectuals - urban and rural - choosing to join these orders, and support their anti-Russian, anti-Communist stance. While the total number of "fanatical believers" or Sufi followers is relatively small (only around 11 percent of Central Asia's total Muslim population), they remain the most militant element of Soviet Islam's counter-culture. [Ref. 52:pp. 25-26]

3. Muslim National Identity

"The Islamic culture," according to Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "is at the base of Central Asian Muslims' new national self-perception." [Ref. 39:p. 56] But Islam serves as only one component part, the other part being their common history (or heritage) as a Turkestani people. These two components tend to shape the Soviet Central Asian Muslim national consciousness as a transethnic "we".

Islam provides Soviet Central Asia with a common culture for both believers and non-believers. Talib Sarymasakovich Saidbaev views Islam as a surviving integrative force shaping national identity.

Because of the widely held perception in the psychology of society which identifies the religious with the national sense of identity, Islam is a force that unites believers and non-believers into one nation, and creates a feeling of unity between the representatives of various nations which profess Islam in the past. This Muslim unity has nothing in common with the unity which currently exists between nations of the Soviet Union. But it should be noted the more so because it manifests itself in daily life. [Refs. 54,39:pp. 193,56-57]

Islam, then, is both a religious force and a national force; life cycle rituals hold significance for both religious and national cultures. Even for non-believers, Islam provides a cultural cohesion for Central Asians. Therefore, Sufism is a guardian of both Islam and national traditions. This dual role of Islam is essential to understanding the Islamic basis for a transethnic national identity. "The religion-nationalism linkage . . . forms a part of the self-perception of the Soviet Muslim community in Central Asia." [Ref. 39:p. 57] Central Asians, fearful of a loss of identity in a "merger" with the Russian nation, view the preservation of their identity as bound to the preservation of Islam. Islam both shaped their national heritage and continues to shape their national spirit. Thus, when Russian hegemonic organizations encourage anti-religious movements and the transformation of Muslim culture into Russian-inspired Soviet culture, Muslim nationalists resist. Without Islam it is unlikely that a traditional national culture would still exist in Central Asia.

The Central Asian national consciousness has been shaped as a transethnic identity by many forces. Islam provides the simple dichotomy of the world in the "Abode of Islam" and the "House of War" (i.e., Dar ul-Islam and Dar al-Harb respectively), which creates a Muslim "we" and a non-Muslim "they". Prior to the Russian revolution, Russia considered all its Muslims as members of one nation - the Nation of Islam - the Russian equivalent of the Ottoman "millet" concept which combines religion and nation. The primary distinction was religious, with linguistic and ethnic distinctions remaining vague and secondary. In Central Asia during this time, the primary inter-millet distinction was between nomads and sedentaries, as opposed to ethnic distinctions. Therefore, all Central Asian sedentaries regardless of ethnicity were called "Sarts" or merchants. Within the Russian Muslim Millet, all ethnic groups formed one nation with one culture, history and tradition. However, this millet was also divided up geographically into three regions representing regional differences. One region was Turkestan which formed a sub-millet - a Central Asian Millet. [Ref. 2:pp. 35-37]

Central Asia or Turkestan during the pre-Bolshevik era reflected the unquestionable link between Islam and Turkestani self-identity. But the collective identity of Turkestanis was relatively weak and fractured. Turkestanis viewed themselves as Muslims and "either as residents of a particular village or town or members of a certain clan or tribe." [Ref. 55:p. 365] While pan-Turkic ideas were gaining popularity among parts of the Central Asian intelligentsia, the masses of civil society had no such common consciousness despite their common historical background. The Basmachi revolt,⁴⁶ according to Martha Olcott, played a crucial role in establishing a greater collective national identity among Central Asians.

The Basmachi played a critical role in the political modernization of Turkestan by bringing together the various elements of Central Asian society in a effort to defeat a common enemy, and through this action the basis of a common consciousness was formed. For the first time the Turkestanis began to develop a political identity, primitive and partially submerged though it was. In the shared act of resistance people began to perceive a sense of community and shared fate. . . . The rebellion brought people from throughout Turkestan into contact with each other, and they realized that they were all trying to protect the same thing. For the first time social cleavages became less important, as the Central Asians placed an increased emphasis on what they shared: a certain way of life, similar languages and customs, and of course, the same religion, Islam. [Ref. 55:p. 365]

The Basmachi Revolt brought this Central Asian Millet into a stronger sense of national consciousness by its resistance to the Soviets.

At the same time, Muslim National Communists in Central Asia sought the development of a single Central Asian State. During the first seven years of the new Soviet State, the old Czarist administrative division of the area along historical and geographic lines (not ethnic lines) called the General Government of Turkestan was maintained and renamed the Autonomous Republic of Turkestan. The former two protectorates were merged into one People's Republics of Bukhara and Khorezm. The first Central Asian Muslim Bolsheviks believed in the eventual merging of these administrative divisions into one unified Central Asian state, Soviet Turkestan, around one common nation, Turkestan. While several spoken languages would exist, a single

⁴⁶The Uzbek word "basmach" means bandit. The Basmachis were a rural-based resistance movement which intermittently fought the Bolshevik regime from 1918 to 1936. Sufi orders and tribal leaders were actively involved, in addition to pure highway bandits. The Basmachis sought to overthrow the Russian control of Turkestan, but had no real political program other than the political autonomy (or national liberation) of Central Asia. [Ref. 56:pp. 319-320(n1)] For more on this movement, see [Refs. 29,55,56].

administrative language called Chagatay would be used.⁴⁷ Yet Stalin prevented the achievement of a unified Turkestani state.⁴⁸ By subdividing the region's Turkic groups along subethnic linguistic lines, national territories were artificially created. The current national consciousness reflects the diversity of Central Asia's history - religious, regional, ethnic, and subethnic linguistic consciousness threads all woven together form their identity.

Today's Central Asian national consciousness is a complex issue. Despite the centripetal nature of the Soviet nationality policy, a clanic-tribal consciousness still remains. Additionally, the centrifugal trend of subdividing Central Asia has produced a derived national identity tied to the various republics. This is especially true among Uzbeks. However, there is also a historically and culturally based transethnic national consciousness as Central Asian Muslims. Moreover, two transnational consciousnesses also exist. The first is the larger Muslim consciousness as part of "Dar ul-Islam." The other is the contrived Soviet consciousness. Within Central Asia, no single national consciousness exists. However, all but the Soviet consciousness synthesizes together to form a Central Asian "we" quite opposed to a Russian "they". Nancy Lubin, in her article "Assimilation and Retention of Ethnic Identity in Uzbekistan," observes that Uzbeks are "deeply proud of the things which make them different from Russians - their large families, their courtyards, their native food and markets, their elaborate festivals and ceremonies." She concludes that as individuals, Uzbeks have a multifaceted consciousness.

As a group, therefore, they are no longer united in perceiving themselves as Muslims, as Turkic speakers, or as a closely-knit Uzbek tribe. What they are united in feeling, however, is the sense that they - Uzbeks, Asians, Muslims, or however they may define themselves individually - are different from the Russians, Europeans, or "infidels" in their midst. [Ref. 57:pp. 284,285]

Hence, in measuring the multifaceted national consciousness of Central Asians, one must define this consciousness both from the perspective of "what Central Asians are" as well as "what Central Asians are not." Within that boundary lies a Central Asian Muslim identity rooted in Islam, in its national past and in its rejection of the

⁴⁷Chagatay, an academic literary language, appeared in the late 15th century. It was used by all Central Asian intellectuals as a "pan-Turkic" language. [Ref. 2:p. 42]

⁴⁸A unified Turkestani state previously existed under Emperor Timur (Tamerlane).

Russianness of Soviet society⁴⁹ - Russian language, Russian identity, and even Russian architecture.⁵⁰ Hence, Central Asia's multifaceted national consciousness still reflects a large scale rejection of Russian hegemony.

4. Central Asia's Contradictory Consciousness

Gramsci considered the intensity of hegemonic social structures to vary over time. When the mass consent of subordinate groups to dominant group culture and ideology (i.e., hegemony) is only superficial, a "contradictory consciousness" can exist. In Central Asia, a contradictory consciousness appears to exist. While this contradictory consciousness is not as precise a dichotomy as Gramsci's theory would suggest (i.e., a contradiction between the explicit and implicit consciousnesses), Central Asians reflect on the practical plane a reduction in individual commitment to Russian national communism. On the abstract plane, the Muslim man-on-the-street may or may not endorse the dominant ideology - Russian communism. But through his adherence to Muslim family values, life cycle rituals, Islamic practices, and an anti-Russian national consciousness, an obvious contradiction exists. Helene Carrere d'Encausse's "Homo Islamicus" testifies to the duality of consciousness among Soviet Muslims. Homo Islamicus "simply by his existence, by his presence in the whole area where the Muslim civilization has existed, he bears witness that the Soviet people have at least two components: the Soviets and the Soviet Muslims." [Ref. 12:p. 264] The "Soviets" to whom she makes reference are really those people within the Soviet state who accept Russian hegemony without contradiction, and the Soviet Muslims are those who by their behavior bear witness to a fundamental Muslim contradiction in consciousness. This Muslim contradictory consciousness implies the Russian Soviets only have a "decadent" hegemony in Muslim areas, especially in Central Asia. A decadent hegemony like this is a vulnerable hegemony, possessing an ambivalent, inconsistent consciousness among Muslim civil society. While this contradiction is not enough to provoke a revolution, it is sufficient to erupt in protests, riots, and demonstrations of discontent. Therefore, when Wimbush and Alexiev state that "large-scale anti-Soviet rioting in recent years in Tashkent, Dushanbe, Chimkent, and other Central Asian cities also testifies that Soviet Muslims continue to resent Soviet

⁴⁹For a contradictory position, that Central Asian nationalism and Islam are not parts of a "crystallized national identity" see a minority position expressed by Alistair McAuley [Ref. 58].

⁵⁰For an interesting account of a petition from 88 Kirghiz villagers concerning the need for Kirghiz traditions in housing construction see [Ref. 59:p. 21].

oppression," [Ref. 60:p. 3] they are describing a decadent Russian hegemony in Central Asia which is experiencing a simple eruption of the Muslim contradictory consciousness. When Rasma Karklins quotes Soviet German emigrants from Central Asia in a 1979 study as saying that now the Kirghiz people "could get along without the Russians, now they have even surpassed them" or "for the Russians too, it is getting difficult to live in Kazakhstan" or "I was in a sanatorium where all others were Turkmen; I heard talk about wanting to succeed from the Soviet Union" or "the Turkmen want their people in the leading positions." [Ref. 61:pp. 76-77] These quotes are specific evidences of non-Muslims (i.e., Soviet Germans) testifying about what Gramsci would call a Muslim contradictory consciousness.⁵¹ The presence of this Muslim contradictory consciousness among Soviet Central Asians is essential to the developing counterhegemonic movement. As the contradictory consciousness of civil society grows,⁵² and the contradiction becomes more and more a hegemonic discontinuity, the counterhegemonic movement will become stronger.

B. COUNTERHEGEMONIC APPARATUSES

The Central Asian counterhegemonic movement is fueled by three counterhegemonic apparatuses: the Muslim family, Sufi orders and leaders, and Central Asian intellectuals. A counterhegemonic apparatus permits the spread of counterhegemonic ideas, issues and forces throughout civil society. However, in the Soviet case, given the lack of private institutions, civil society has collapsed down to the masses, the family structure, and those institutions which continue to operate despite the State's coercive power. For Gramsci, a counterhegemony developed primarily within the institutions of civil society. Therefore, two of these apparatuses - the Muslim family and Sufi orders - are found within that part of civil society which the State failed to remove. These two apparatuses have found a third "ally" in the Muslim intellectuals. Together, these three propel the counterhegemony along.

⁵¹One wonders if those Turkmen were in the sanatorium because their "anti-socialist behavior" had caused socialist "mental disorders", or because their contradictory consciousness was evidenced by "anti-socialist behavior."

⁵²Not all contradictory consciousness is the same in degree or strength. While Sufi adepts would appear to be operating with a high degree of contradiction, the vast masses who only adhere to the three basic life-cycle rituals would appear to possess low degree of contradiction. Due to this lack of a high degree of contradiction throughout all of Central Asian civil society, the counterhegemony is still in the process of developing. What is needed by Western analysts now is access to information about Central Asians and study on the true breadth and depth of their actual consciousness (both implicit and explicit). Such access appears impossible. For an example of a similar study done in Yugoslavia, see [Ref. 62].

1. The Muslim Family

The Muslim family both maintains the practice of the Muslim counter-culture and passes that counter-culture on to the next generation. Thus, a key attribute of this apparatus is its ability to develop counterhegemonic attitudes prior to the Soviet State's ability to develop an acceptance of hegemonic attitudes. The Soviet's themselves highlight this instrumental role of the family.

Unfortunately, there are substantial shortcomings in upbringing work among young people [in Turkmenistan], shortcomings that often manifest themselves in deviations from socialist morality and observance of old customs and traditions. A young person's views and actions are influenced by his environment [i.e., family]. And often that environment serves to distort his consciousness and "transmits" vestiges of the past to him. In a family in which the mother strictly sees to it that her daughter or daughter-in-law observes old rituals, . . . young people may grow up acquiring views that have nothing in common with Soviet morality Religious customs persist, in part, because as they are passed on from one generation to the next, they are often presented as something national or folkloric. Sociological polling conducted in various districts of Turkmenia has shown that grandparents sometimes refuse to live with young families or help them care for the children unless the families observe old customs . . . the process of consolidation of the socialist family is being impeded by backward parents who try to force young couples to adhere to traditional customs. Yet these customs objectively serve to promote the ideology of Islam and encourage ideas of religious exclusivity. These religious traditions hinder the establishment of new, socialist, family relationships. [Ref. 63:pp. 20-21]

This problem for the Soviets is nothing more than the Muslim family socializing the next generation in religious and nationalistic ways. The Muslim mother appears particularly influential over her children. Both educated and uneducated Moslem mothers socialize their children in this manner. "Virtually every Moslem woman considers the inculcation of religious views to be an integral part of her childrearing duties There are no universal methods of education to counter women's religiousness." [Ref. 64:p. 14] Therefore, the Muslim family's influence, especially the mother's influence is an essential element in allowing the counterhegemony to grow with each progressive generation.

The Muslim family also serves another important role; it demographically expands the movement by its large family size. The family not only socializes the next generation with counterhegemonic ideas, but it makes the next generation larger. The 2.15 to 2.91 gross reproduction rate for Central Asian republics (1978-1979) represents a very effective counterhegemonic apparatus [Ref. 27:p. 66]. For Gramsci, the counterhegemony grew by the spread of ideas through private institutions counterhegemonically controlled. For Central Asia, the spread of ideas is largely

through the high reproduction rate of the Central Asian Muslim family. This "la vengeance des berceaux" factor can permit the Central Asians counterhegemony to eventually surround the Soviet State in Central Asia. Thus, the growing ethnic imbalance can be destabilizing to the Soviets due to its counterhegemonic significance.

2. Sufism and Sufi Leaders

Sufism in Central Asia fulfills several roles for the counterhegemonic movement. First, it preserves the purity of the Islamic religion for the population [Ref. 52:p. 30]. Second, since Islamic and nationalistic customs are tightly interwoven, Sufism serves as a protectorate of Central Asian Muslim culture, traditions and values.

Islam represented by Sufism, appears as the guardian of national, moral and cultural values, which implies that a negative attitude towards the faith of the ancestors . . . would amount to "national treason." [Ref. 52:p. 20]

Third, Sufism provides the Central Asians - the masses and the intellectuals - with a counter-ideology:

For the believers and more broadly for all those who are not satisfied with the spiritual vulgarity of Marxism-Leninism, Sufism represents the exact opposite of compulsory diamat (dialectical materialism), while the tariqa provides a perfect organized framework which enables those who join it to escape the dreary reality of Soviet life and to venture into another world. [Ref. 52:p. 30]

Fourth, Sufism develops the national consciousness of Central Asians as a non-Russian "we." This consciousness has political overtones and has historically been a part of Central Asian Sufism. Eugene Schuyler testified to the political nature of Central Asian Sufi orders back in the late 1800s. Sufi sermons had both religious and political messages.

Instances of their [i.e., Sufi leader's] treasonable language [towards Russia] were only too well proved because officers, frequently in passing by unobserved, had heard parts of their sermons which usually consisted of the narration of some old legend where people were enslaved by the infidels on account of their irreligious life and practices; and end with an appeal to repentances saying that thus the infidel may be driven away. [Ref. 65:vol. 1, p. 258]

Therefore, the religious activism of Sufis carries with it political activism. Lastly, Sufi orders represent organizations which are structured similar to disciplined revolutionary "cell groups" and can function as counterhegemonic societies - fulfilling or supplanting State roles and functions.

Soviet authorities have not succeeded in infiltrating the tariqa, neither can they win them over or destroy them. They are indeed the only social and political mass organization in the Soviet Union outside the Communist Party. To the Muslim dissenters Sufism provides not only a corpus of ideals, symbols, beliefs and techniques leading to God, but also a highly efficient organization with a discipline stronger than that of the Communist Party itself. Its existence proves that organized groups . . . can survive outside the Soviet system as closed societies with their own ideologies, rules, education systems, justice and even finance and victoriously challenge [the Soviet State]. [Ref. 52:p. 22]

Thus, Sufi orders are counterhegemonic apparatuses operating outside of Russian national communist hegemony. They represent the strongest elements of the counterhegemonic movement and contain the basic counterhegemonic superstructure for Central Asian Muslim civil society.

Sufism is a very autocratic, centrally structured phenomena. The leaders of Sufi orders - the ishans, unofficial mullahs, etc. - are what Gramsci would call "organic intellectuals." Central Asian Sufi leaders are the Muslim "thinker-organizers" which direct and manage the ideas and inspirations of Central Asia - the group to which they "organically" belong. Sufi leaders maintain the survival of both the Islamic religion and national culture. Chantal Lemerrier-Quelquejaye describes the function performed by Sufi leaders as unofficial mullahs this way:

A religious creed depends upon the authoritative guidance of a class of "technicians", namely clerics who are competent to perform the consecrated rites, and who in the particular case of Islam would know enough Arabic to recite the prayers and read and explain the sacred texts. [Ref. 52:pp. 4-5]

Sufi leaders who lead Central Asia's "non-mosque" Islamic trend are intellectuals - cleric intellectuals. They are also managers and technicians of a counterhegemonic apparatus - Sufi orders. They also have a broad base of contact with civil society through their "clerical" role as part of the life cycle rituals. Therefore, these Sufi leaders are the organic intellectuals of the developing counterhegemony. But Sufi leaders are not alone in providing leadership for the religiously and politically active elements of society, and in motivating the passive elements. The Muslim traditional intellectuals also are involved - developing a Central Asian national consciousness.

3. Central Asian Muslim Intellectuals

The Muslim intelligentsia in Central Asia are what Gramsci calls "traditional intellectuals." For Gramsci, traditional intellectuals, like scholars, tend to function autonomously and are not organically linked to their group of origin. While the

Central Asian Muslim intellectuals are not quite as autonomous and as removed from their Muslim origins as Gramsci might theorize, nevertheless they do function much the same as his description of traditional intellectuals. Richard Pipes describes the position of this intelligentsia as a unique blend of both Soviet and Muslim features, and as a "transmission belt" of Soviet or Russian ideas to the masses.

The Central Asian Muslim intelligentsia possesses many of the characteristics which distinguish the Soviet intelligentsia as a whole, but in addition, it also displays certain traits engendered by special conditions prevailing in Central Asia. The Muslim intelligentsia occupies in peculiar position; by origin, language, culture, and family ties, it is connected to the Muslim population; by training, work and much of its world-outlook, it is identified with the Soviet regime. It thus belongs fully to neither of the two groups, constituting something of a third element which functions as a connecting link between the Russian-dominated regime and the native population. [Ref. 66:p. 305]

Thus the Central Asian Muslim intelligentsia has historically served as the Russian's "deputies" - giving homogeneity and self-awareness to the dominant group, as well as performing "subaltern functions of social hegemony and political government." [Ref. 6:p.12] Yet within this intelligentsia, the Central Asian Muslim intellectuals - the scholars, historians, poets, novelists, artists, etc. - serve as a counterhegemonic subgroup.

Central Asian Muslim intellectuals are actively involved in the assertion of Central Asian cultural autonomy. Since World War II, Muslim intellectuals have been filled

with a strong desire to rediscover the national past of its people . . . of course this search leads to the rediscovery of a common Muslim past . . . for the simple reason that there is no such thing as a purely Uzbek tradition, nor a purely Karakalpak culture, and that when a Karakalpak intellectual tries to discover his origins he discovers a past common to all Turkic, or rather to all Muslim people. [Ref. 67:p. 181]

This rediscovery and rehabilitation of the past aids the transethnic national consciousness of Central Asians and reinforces their separate and even superior non-Russian culture and heritage. Among the Central Asian elite, the feelings of belonging to a Central Asian Millet has been cultivated by the slow but steady rediscovery of the pre-Russian Revolution Central Asian past. This movement, called "mirasism" (from the Arabic "miras" meaning "patrimony"), has brought about a

resurgence of nationality oriented novels, the defense of Central Asian languages,⁵³ the writings of national histories, and the revitalization of Central Asian artistic and literary expression (to name only a few examples). In this process of mirasism, Daniel Matuszewski notes,

The Turkic peoples in the USSR have become increasingly assertive. Much of the recent Turkic literature in the Soviet Union is nothing less than an attempt to resurrect the past, a proud and accomplished past which had been forgotten or suppressed in the political transformations of the first decades of the Soviet period. [Ref. 17:p. 76]

Part of this Turkic miras literature attests not only to the difference between Central Asian and Russian values but warns people not to abandon their native heritage by assimilating into the Russian dominated Soviet culture.⁵⁴ The historiography of mirasism has even emphasized more "reactionary" native leaders who defended native territories against invaders.⁵⁵

Through mirasism, Central Asian intellectuals not only can revitalize national consciousness and heritage among the masses, but reconnect themselves to their religious origins. Much of Central Asia's great poetry is Sufi influenced. In fact, almost all the Turkestani poets in the 12th to the 18th century were Sufi adepts and their works reflect a strong Sufi mysticism. Therefore,

Thanks to mirasism, Sufism has become more and more a central and crucial part of growing national awareness . . . during the last two or three years, a new trend has appeared in the cultural life of the Central Asian intelligentsia, a new and constantly growing interest in the "people" (khalq), not only, as before, in the rulers and the great men. In Central Asia, more than elsewhere in the Muslim world, Sufism corresponds to the deepest layer of folk culture (Ahmed Yasawi [a 12th century Sufi] was the first poet to write in a Turkic language). because of this new "populist" trend, Central Asian intellectuals trying to find roots other than Russian or German Marxism discover the forbidden beauties of Islam and the glory of their national patrimony. It is not surprising that they come to prefer the poems of Ahmed Yasawi to Karl Marx's *Das Kapital* or the writing of Plekhanov. [Ref. 52:p. 30]

⁵³An example of this is Erkin Vahidov's 1978 poem "My Mother Tongue is Dying." [Ref. 68].

⁵⁴For an interesting treatment of these literary "warnings" see [Ref. 69].

⁵⁵For a brief list of the main themes of mirasism, see [Ref. 39:pp. 62-63].

Through mirasism, the normally less religious Central Asian intellectuals are rediscovering and reexploring their Sufi roots. This trend should provide a greater yoking together of nationalistic intellectuals and religious Sufi leaders. While intellectuals have been involved in Sufism in the recent Soviet past, the current mirasism trend should establish an even greater tie than before.

Looking back to Gramsci, this development of a greater Muslim traditional intellectual and Muslim organic intellectual connection is essential for a developing counterhegemony. The allying together of these two Muslim intellectual groups provides the basis for a neo-Gramscian political strategy - the establishment of a Central Asian Muslim cultural and moral superiority, independent of its direct political power. For Gramsci, only after this cultural and moral superiority is established in a counterhegemonic movement and a "war of position" is won does the movement need to take on a more political emphasis in order to wrest political power away from the State through a paramilitary, revolutionary "war of position." But in order for each of these three counterhegemonic apparatuses - the Muslim family, Sufi orders and leaders, and Central Asian Muslim intellectuals - to become transformed from part of a counterhegemonic "war of position" to a "war of maneuver," a crisis in the Russian hegemony must occur.

C. COUNTERHEGEMONIC FUTURE

Soviet Central Asia's counterhegemony is a developing counterhegemony. While Sufi adepts represent the strongest elements of the counter-cultural movement, most Central Asians are not as active. However, a Muslim contradictory consciousness appears to exist on a broad basis within Central Asian civil society. What the future requires for Central Asia's counterhegemony is to further develop the strength of the movement and to win the battle for the Central Asian Muslim mind. While some consider the lack of overt political aspirations or goals to be a flaw in any developing revolutionary situation in Central Asia, the author's view asserts that this represents not a flaw for Central Asia as much as a flaw in Western analysis. Gramsci's theories rest on the need for two revolutions to displace State power. The first revolution only fights cultural and ideological struggles trying to undercut the hegemonic rule of the dominant group and force a greater State reliance upon coercion as opposed to consensus. Following a "crisis in hegemony" or an "organic crisis" the counterhegemony can transfer from a "war of position" strategy to a "war of

maneuver." During a Central Asian "war of maneuver," political goals will become more paramount. Are they trying to succeed, establish greater autonomy, seek an improved political position? While these questions about political goals are useful, they are not valid concerns until after the organic crisis. Since an organic crisis is not just a specific moment in time but rather an extended moment of days, months or even years, the counterhegemony will be able to "change gears" for the new "war." Therefore, the most important concern today in evaluating the Central Asian counterhegemonic future is to evaluate the prospects for an organic crisis in Central Asia.

Gramsci emphasized that an organic crisis reflected the convergence of two smaller crises - a crisis in the belief system and a crisis of the State. It can either be a foreign-induced organic crisis - such as the strain of a foreign war, or a State-induced organic crisis - such as the poor handling of a passive revolution, or a structurally-induced organic crisis - such as an economic crisis or recession. Today, most Western experts are of one of three opinions relating to a future Central Asian crisis.⁵⁶ The first is that the Soviets have no potential for any crisis in Central Asia either now or in the future. The second opinion suggests that while Soviet control or Russian hegemony is not absolute, it is strong enough to endure unless a foreign-induced situation arises. Alexander Bennigsen and Marie Broxup's conclusions reflect this line of thought.

barring a major crisis - such as foreign war - the present status quo in the Soviet Union will be uncompromisingly preserved as long as possible. The final inescapable, violent crisis will be delayed, but for how long? [Ref. 2:p. 152]

The third opinion takes a domestic perspective, that either a State-induced situation - e.g., a failed governmental reform - or a structurally-induced situation - e.g., the surfacing of a fundamental contradiction or flaw within the structure of the Soviet State or society - is capable of inducing an organic crisis. Brian D. Silver and William O. McCagg, Jr.'s conclusions reflect this line of thought.

Social mobilization is the most important goal for the individual - improvement of his own lot and that of his family, first, and only later improvement of his whole community's lot. It is readily perceptible that this rule works two ways.

⁵⁶These three opinions are directed towards a general crisis in the region, but can also be related to a future organic crisis as well.

As long as a governing power in a multinational state can offer individuals more than continued membership in an ethnic group can offer, assimilation or at least subservient political status is likely to be accepted, even if this results in the gradual extinction of the group. But once the balance tips - once the governing power reaches the limits of its benevolence to individual citizens and begins to seem oppressive or unresponsive to their perceived rights or needs - then "disintegration" will predictably occur and spread. [Ref. 70:p. xx]

In the first opinion, a foreign power's capability to incite an organic crisis is negligible, in the second it is great, in the third it is not required. This paper argues throughout against the first opinion; however, either the second or third appear feasible. While it is difficult to predict foreign-induced situations like a war, or State-induced situations like failed reforms, a neo-Gramscian perspective can explain why an organic crisis can occur within the Soviet State without any outside assistance - i.e., a structurally-induced organic crisis.

Currently, three factors tend to have a synergistic effect on structurally inducing an organic crisis in the Soviet Union. First, the Central Asian population boom itself is producing a structurally precarious situation. From a "Deutschian" perspective, one could describe the situation as those mobilized into Central Asian society (via birth) are multiplying at a more rapid rate than those assimilated into the larger, Soviet unit. The conclusion, based on Karl Deutsch's work, is that Muslim society is growing faster than Soviet community. Integration requires that the reverse be true that those assimilated multiply at the more rapid rate to allow the community to grow faster than society. [Ref. 71:p. 99] As long as the Muslim society continues to grow faster, the counterhegemony can eventually by sheer numbers "surround the State" and force an organic crisis. But this Muslim population boom presents the Soviets with a corollary problem - the growing surplus of labor inputs in Central Asia.

The second factor which contributes to a structurally-induced organic crisis is the surplus labor supply in Central Asia, or more appropriately, the labor deficits in the Soviet's European and Siberian regions. These regional labor shortages reflect the overall shrinking of the Soviet labor force. In attempting to use the surplus labor supply found in Central Asia, the Soviets face several significant obstacles. First, Central Asian labor, traditionally low skilled, is qualitatively unfit to fill the Soviet's future industrial needs. Additionally, Central Asians have been extremely resistant to move, especially outside of their regional area, and redistribute the labor surplus to labor deficit areas. Lastly, the Soviet's have been reluctant to move industry into this region, preferring to allow Central Asians to remain primarily rural exporters of raw

materials like cotton. The more immediate results of not correcting this labor supply and demand problem will be a decline in Soviet economic development. Since the Soviet State as a "modernizer," continually improving the technical efficiency with which they use their mode of production, is essential to ensuring a preponderance of consensus rule, any failure in this area weakens Russian hegemony. The majority opinion among Western scholars on this subject is that this labor dilemma, caused basically by cultural differences between Slavs and Muslims, will pose serious problems for the Soviet Union.⁵⁷ Thus, this labor problem, if uncorrected, can lead to an economic crisis and force a structurally induced organic crisis. On the other hand, if the Soviets seek to forcibly redistribute this labor - i.e., an example of a poorly handled domestic reform - this can also lead to a cultural clash and an organic crisis. In either case, this labor problem can contribute to an organic crisis without relying on any outside foreign assistance.

The third factor which contributes to a future structurally-induced organic crisis does not relate to Central Asian Muslims at all. It relates to the resurgence of Russian nationalism within the Soviet State. This resurgence is caused in part by the effects of non-Russian mirasism on Russians. Roman Solchanyk sees an increasing concern among some circles of the Russian intelligentsia with how "Russians, Russian history, and the USSR in general are perceived by the outside world." [Ref. 75:p. 1] This concern reflects Russian perceptions that the "Russianness" of their State is being overlooked, and that the negative stereotype of Russians is "ostensibly widespread in the West." [Ref. 75:p. 5] The conclusion, as Solchanyk sees it, is that

The Soviet preoccupation with nurturing a positive Russian image, on the one hand, and warnings to the non-Russians not to "inflate" their achievements, on the other, betrays a certain degree of insecurity in the Kremlin with regard to both the Russian self-image and the relationship between the Russians and the non-Russians in the USSR. [Ref. 75:p. 5]

This emphasis on the Russianness of the Soviet State also produces various corollary movements, such as a greater emphasis on Russian literacy in Central Asia [Ref. 76]. This new emphasis on Russian culture and heritage contributes to a

⁵⁷For a concise opinion of the major arguments involved in the Central Asian labor surplus dilemma, see Michael Rywkin's article [Ref. 72], which argues from a majority viewpoint. For a minority position, arguing that modernization within Central Asia will overcome cultural differences and that Central Asian labor is primarily an economic issue without cultural overtones, see [Ref. 73]. Lastly, for a Soviet opinion see Topilin's excellent study in its abridged, translated form [Ref. 74].

structurally-induced organic crisis. The Soviets' ability to maneuver and make cultural reforms that are pro-Islam are limited by Russian nationalism, and Russian nationalism - backed by State power - can come into the growing counter-culture of Central Asia.

These three factors are important because alone each could with time produce an organic crisis. However, together they have a synergistic effect propelling the Central Asian counterhegemony closer to an organic crisis. Additionally, these three together can lead to the unravelling of Russian hegemony without an "Afghanistan War" or United States involvement. Thus within the "State of nations" currently lie the ingredients for its unravelling. While the Central Asian counterhegemony is not the only such movement within the Soviet Union, it appears to be properly positioned to win "the battle for the mind" which is so essential in any revolutionary or opposing struggle against the Soviet State. We in the West would do well to consider the truth of Wayne Vucinich's exhortation over twenty years ago:

The Soviet ideology must be fought not only on the political and military front, but also on the cultural and educational front. [Ref. 77:p. 12]

Using a neo-Gramscian framework, one can see on which front the Central Asians are currently fighting. The future for them remains a counterhegemonic one.

V. CONCLUSION

The Soviet Union is facing a serious challenge from Central Asian Muslims to its internal rule and domestic stability. This challenge, highlighted and analyzed by many Western scholars, has often been articulated as separate or interrelated particularistic problems. Even those works that attempt to discuss all of the major issues concerning the Soviet Central Asian Muslim challenge are largely descriptive [Ref. 27]. Their conclusions, which may be accurate, still lack a more universalistic theoretical basis. The literature, which has come a long way from the times of "tourist" writings, has not evolved very far from its scholarly beginnings in the 1950s.⁵⁸ As a result, while the literature is very strong in and useful for description and explanation, it lacks a firm theoretical foundation for prediction and prescription.

The purpose of this study has been to establish a theoretical foundation for discussing the Soviet Central Asian challenge using Antonio Gramsci's theories of hegemony and counterhegemony. While Gramsci, a Marxist and an historical materialist, took a class-based approach to understanding the State, State rule and revolution against a State, this author has inverted his approach for a non-Marxist application. The fundamental key to applying Gramsci's theories and (neo-Gramscian theories) is the mechanism for rule used by the dominant social group within civil society. This mechanism, called hegemony, allows the dominant group to effect its rule over subordinate groups. Hegemony, which is the cultural and ideological ascendancy of the dominant group's social vision over the social vision of all other social groups, permits a consensus-oriented rule. The subordinate groups, who should be alienated by the State, have "bought into" the dominant groups *weltanschauung* and are, therefore, passive towards revolution. Gramsci sought to overcome this passivity through counterhegemony and a "war of position." Only by providing an alternate social vision based on the culture and values of the subordinate groups, can they counter the hegemony of the dominant group. This vehicle, called counterhegemony, was the basis for Gramsci's alternative revolutionary strategy. Only by staging a

⁵⁸The "father of Western tourist" writings concerning Russian and Soviet Central Asian Muslims is Eugene Schuyler [Ref. 65]. For an analysis of the development of early scholarly research by Westerners on the Muslim issues of the Soviet Union see Serge Zenkovsky's article [Ref. 78].

counterhegemonic revolution can the State's hegemonic rule be defeated. An initial paramilitary revolution, called a "war of maneuver," would be both inappropriate and unsuccessful in this situation. Only by first winning a counterhegemonic revolution, called a "war of position," can the State be surrounded by people who no longer "buy into" the dominant group's social vision. After a "war of position" has been won, a "war of maneuver" can proceed successfully. Therefore, Gramsci has elevated the "battle for the mind" to the position of preeminence within the revolutionary struggle. Gramsci's theories provide the framework for evaluating the Soviet Central Asian Muslim challenge as a "battle for the mind."

The Soviet Union is a "State of nations" hegemonically ruled by a single nation - the Russian nation - through a national ideology - Russian national communism. The dominant social division in the Soviet Union is national groups. The Russian nation is the ruling nation, weaving its ideology and culture throughout the social fabric of society. Communism serves as a useful ideology for Russian hegemony. Russian hegemony pre-existed under Czarist rule. The Russian Revolution in 1917 was a social revolution of the class structure of civil society, but only a passive revolution of Russian rule. As a result, capitalistic elements were eradicated from society while Russian rule was maintained through Russian national communists. The Communist Party institutionalized the joining together of this new ideology - communism - with traditional Russian chauvinism. The Russian nation became the "vanguard nation" within the Soviet "State of nations." While Soviet rule has changed throughout the almost seventy years of Russian communism, Russian hegemony has continued to play a foundational role - permeating the State. The Soviet State functions in three primary roles to maintain its rule: an educator, a modernizer, and a dictator. While in the early days the State was very much a dictatorship based on a conflictual model of society, it laid the basis for a later emphasis on educator and modernizer roles. Today, the Russian hegemonic rule is based on a dominance of consensus rule using the educator and modernizer roles, with the dictatorial role reserved for the rebellious "fringe" elements. Nevertheless, in Soviet Central Asia that consensus is being threatened by the "contradictory consciousness" of the Muslim people. The Russians appear to be losing the "battle for the Central Asian mind."

Soviet Central Asian Muslims are counterhegemonically challenging Russian hegemony. While the challenge is isolated largely to the geographic area of Central Asia, it does seriously threaten the stability of the Soviet State. The challenge involves

three key areas. First, the rapidly growing Muslim population of Central Asia is presenting the Soviets with a demographic imbalance. Yet this demographic boom reflects a fundamental difference between Russian Slavic values and Central Asian Muslim values. At the heart of this Muslim value system lies Islam. Both official Islam and unofficial "parallel" Islam shape the Central Asian's contradictory consciousness. In a state where religion is supposed to be dying, Islam is not. Regardless of individual beliefs, Central Asians are continuing to follow an Islamic value system. Lastly, Central Asia has had a long historic tradition that is being rediscovered by the Central Asians themselves. While the Russians succeeded in subdividing Russian Turkestan into separate republics, it has not abnegated the national consciousness of the region. Islam serves as a unifier of the Central Asian consciousness - Uzbek, Turkomen, Kirghiz, and Tajik ethnic identities forming a single, multifaceted, transethnic national identity. This is the significant "we" in the area and is opposed to the Russian "they". Islam and national identity are two elements tightly woven together, very similar to Russian Communism. The resulting national identity in Central Asia, therefore, is both religious and national. Therefore just as Russian hegemony is both cultural and ideological, Muslim-Turkestani culture and the Islamic religion provide the basis for Soviet Central Asia's counterhegemony.

The key elements which propel this war of position along are the family unit itself, the unofficial Mullahs or Sufi leaders, and the Central Asian Muslim intellectuals. The Muslim family serves as the primary counterhegemonic apparatus. The Sufi leaders and the Central Asian Muslim intellectuals form Gramsci's organic and traditional intellectuals - leading the movement along by providing the continuation of Islamic practices and the rediscovery of an historic national past.

Finally, Central Asia's population growth itself is sufficient to propel the Soviet State into a crisis of hegemony - an organic crisis. By the year 2000, every second Soviet birth will be a Muslim child - most likely a Central Asian Muslim child. Demographics alone are sufficient to allow this counterhegemony to surround the Soviet State's hegemonic apparatuses. However, if the Soviets fail to use this growing Central Asian labor surplus, they may face an economic crisis prior to the counterhegemony's surrounding the State. Because Russian hegemony relies so heavily on the national assimilation produced by economic modernization, this growing Central Asian labor surplus itself can produce a structurally-induced organic crisis. Either way, by demographics alone or with an accompanying economic crisis, Central

Asians can wage and potentially win a "war of position" within the Soviet Union. Therefore, while the Soviet Union today appears protected against a "war of maneuver" similar to the Basmachi Revolt of the 1920s and 1930s, it does appear extremely vulnerable to a "war of position." In this light, Stalin's provisions for the stability of the Soviet system appear misdirected.

In our Soviet country we must evolve a system of government which will permit us with certainty to anticipate all changes, to perceive everything that is going on among peasants, the non-Russian nationals and the Russians; the system of barometers which will anticipate every change, register and forestall a Basmachi movement, . . . and all possible storms and ill-fortune [Ref. 79:p. 29].

Today's threat is not a Basmachi "war of maneuver" but a Central Asian Muslim "war of position." Counterhegemony may allow the Central Asians to succeed in freeing themselves from Russia's rule. In light of Gramsci's theory and its application to Russian hegemony and Central Asia's developing counterhegemony, Michael Rywkin's prediction concerning Moscow's Muslim challenge appears dangerously accurate for the Russians themselves.

The Basmachi cavalry is not about to descend into the valleys and cities of Central Asia to challenge the Russian; but the growing weight of geopolitical circumstances, demographic reality, and Muslim ethnic "innate drives" will increasingly do so, in a less dramatic but no less dangerous way [Ref. 27:p. 152].

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